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LUCAS GUTTENTAG∗ 
This Article explores the importance of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to the 
current debate over immigration federalism and the preemption of state and local 
immigration laws under the Supremacy Clause. The 1870 Act, enacted by the 
Reconstruction Congress after the Civil War, prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of “alienage.” The Article shows that the Act’s protections are an essential 
component of the federal framework limiting sub-federal immigration laws. In 
Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court found key parts of Arizona’s SB 
1070 immigration enforcement act preempted. The Court focused on the federal 
government’s broad authority to enforce the immigration act, to set enforcement 
priorities, and to determine the terms and conditions for the admission and 
expulsion of foreign nationals. The author refers to this as the “immigration 
control” basis for preemption.    
The Article explains that the immigration control element is important but 
incomplete. That focus omits consideration of the separate and additional source 
of federal primacy derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1870 that the author calls 
the “immigrant equality” basis for preemption. The Article discusses the origins of 
the Act’s protections, their subsequent codification, and the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on the Act’s anti-discrimination mandate in immigration preemption cases 
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over the course of nearly a century. The Article argues that recognizing immigrant 
equality as a source of federal supremacy has significant consequences for 
immigration federalism. The equality principle assesses the discriminatory 
consequences of sub-federal immigration measures and draws a fundamental 
distinction between measures that further immigrant equality (often referred to as 
“sanctuary” ordinances) and laws that threaten to engender discrimination (like 
SB 1070). The Article concludes that robust federal supremacy barring punitive 
immigration enforcement laws can easily coexist with ample leeway for states and 
localities to adopt immigrant protection laws that safeguard non-citizens in 
municipal life.    
INTRODUCTION 
State and local immigration laws pit claims of federal primacy 
against assertions of state autonomy. In Arizona v. United States,1 the 
Supreme Court adopted a muscular view of federal immigration 
supremacy to strike down essential parts of an Arizona law aimed at 
Arizona’s undocumented immigrants. After a lull of many decades in 
the Court’s immigration preemption jurisprudence, the Supremacy 
Clause reemerged powerfully to limit state immigration legislation.2 
The Supreme Court’s displacement of state law was rooted in the 
complexities of the immigration statute, Arizona’s potential intrusion 
into foreign relations, and the federal government’s power to set 
immigration enforcement priorities. Arizona held that central parts of 
the state legislation, popularly known as SB 1070, were inconsistent 
with the strictures of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and 
with the enforcement discretion vested in the Executive Branch. The 
Court read federal law as erecting a de facto federal ceiling on 
immigration enforcement that state laws cannot exceed. 
The Arizona decision recognized one element of the federal 
framework governing immigrants and immigration. The Court 
robustly validated the federal government’s broad authority to 
enforce the immigration statutes, to set federal immigration 
enforcement policies, and to determine the terms and conditions on 
which foreign nationals are admitted to and expelled from the United 
States. This basis for federal immigration preemption is grounded in 
 
 1.  132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
 2.  Outside the immigration-specific context, the Supremacy Clause and preemption have 
featured prominently in Supreme Court decisions of recent years. For an excellent discussion, 
see, for example, Ernest Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2012) (providing a comprehensive 
review of preemption doctrine in the Roberts Court). My focus is limited to the scope of 
preemption with respect to sub-federal immigration measures.  
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notions of sovereignty and enforcement that confer vast authority on 
the political branches to set immigration policy. I refer to it as the 
“immigration control” or “control” component of immigration 
preemption. 
Absent from Arizona, however, is a second and separate ground 
for limiting state immigration policies that has long served as a source 
for preemption of sub-federal laws. This basis for preemption is 
rooted in the longstanding federal prohibitions against state 
“alienage” discrimination that require equality of treatment between 
citizens and “aliens” across a wide spectrum of civic life. The source of 
this federal protection is the historic Civil Rights Act of 1870 enacted 
by the Reconstruction Congress after the Civil War.3 The 1870 Act 
consciously outlawed discriminatory state immigration laws to protect 
unpopular non-citizens of that era. Over the ensuing century, the 
Supreme Court recognized the 1870 Act as an important factor in 
defining the federal interests that preempt state immigration 
legislation under the Supremacy Clause. I refer to this as the 
“immigrant equality” or “equality” component of federal immigration 
preemption. 
In recent decades, the preemptive force of the 1870 Act—and of 
the immigrant equality component of immigration preemption—has 
been largely overlooked or forgotten. My purpose is to reinvigorate 
the importance of the 1870 Act as a source for preemption of sub-
federal immigration measures. I believe that restoring the role of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1870 is necessary to a proper understanding of the 
federal framework governing immigration and immigrants—and 
hence to defining the limits of immigration federalism. 
The purpose of preemption is to enforce the “clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”4 In the immigration context, the Supreme 
Court has explained that the Supremacy Clause bars sub-federal 
measures that “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”5 and that it 
ensures local compliance with the country’s “overriding national 
policies”6 with respect to foreign nationals. The Civil Rights Act of 
 
 3.  Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16–17, 16 Stat. 140, 144. 
 4.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)). See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64–65 (2002); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2002); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 
(2000). 
 5.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 6.  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971). The focus here is implied preemption. 
GUTTENTAG 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  9:10 PM 
4 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 8:1 
1870 is an integral part of those national policies, and the immigrant 
equality principle must stand on equal footing with other aspects of 
federal law if the “full purposes and objectives” of our “overriding 
national policies” are to be enforced. 
Fully recognizing the immigrant equality component of the 
federal framework has practical implications for the current 
immigration federalism debate and gives greater normative content to 
federal limits on state authority. Embracing immigrant equality as a 
federal objective also helps to distinguish between two types of 
contemporary sub-federal immigration measures. Those local laws 
that increase discrimination against immigrants are at odds with the 
immigrant equality goal, whereas those local measures that diminish 
discrimination and advance immigrant integration or protection 
(often confusingly referred to as “sanctuary” laws) further that 
federal objective. 
My claim is not that immigrant equality trumps all other 
considerations or dictates the outcome of every immigration 
preemption question. Rather, I argue that immigrant equality is an 
essential—and forgotten—ingredient in contemporary Supremacy 
Clause analysis. Courts should revitalize the equality norm in deciding 
whether a particular state immigration provision impedes federal 
interests or hinders federal goals. Failing to give sufficient weight to 
immigrant equality leads to an impoverished conception of the 
objectives of Congress in the immigration realm. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes Arizona v. 
United States to illustrate how the Court’s preemption ruling rested 
on an immigration control view of the federal interest. Part II 
examines the basis for the immigrant equality component of federal 
immigration preemption. I first explain the origins of the 1870 Civil 
Rights Act’s prohibitions against sub-federal alienage discrimination. 
I then review the role of the 1870 Act in the Court’s immigration 
federalism rulings—bookended by Yick Wo v. Hopkins7 in 1886 and 
Graham v. Richardson8 in 1971—that recognize the equality mandate 
in the 1870 Act as an important ingredient in federal preemption of 
state laws. 
 
I do not address the more straightforward preemption inquiry where sub-federal regulation is 
barred under an express preemption clause or as an impermissible regulation of immigration 
interfering with exclusive federal power. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).   
 7.  118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 8.  403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
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In Part III, I offer some preliminary observations on how 
recognition of the immigrant equality element may affect current 
assessment of sub-federal laws. I argue that equality adds a ground for 
preempting laws that cause discrimination and for validating 
measures that promote immigrant integration and protection.9 
I. THE REEMERGENCE OF IMMIGRATION PREEMPTION: ARIZONA V. 
UNITED STATES 
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down three 
of four contested provisions of SB 1070, Arizona’s immigration 
enforcement law.10 The Court’s decision articulated a sweeping vision 
of the federal immigration enforcement power—and the attendant 
preemption of laws threatening to exceed it or encroach on its 
priorities.11 
 
 
 
 9.  The current controversies over state and city laws have generated substantial 
scholarship on “immigration federalism.” For a small sample of valuable commentary 
addressing current measures, see, for example, Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The 
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 
(2011); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate 
Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 2037 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration 
Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007). An earlier round of scholarship 
addressed issues arising from California’s Proposition 187 adopted in 1994. See, e.g., Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453 (1995); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 201 (1994); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and 
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1995); Peter J. Spiro, The 
States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121 (1994). I am not 
aware of any articles examining the 1870 Civil Rights Act in relation specifically to the 
Supremacy Clause and immigration preemption.  
 10.  132 S. Ct. at 2510–11. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods 
Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (West 2013).  
 11.  For my more extensive discussion of Arizona, and its implications for state 
immigration laws, see Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power: 
Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Guttentag, 
Immigration Preemption] (discussing the Court’s support for federal primacy in the context of 
immigration enforcement). For insightful commentary on the Court’s ruling, see David Martin, 
Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2012). See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, The 
Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); The 
Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 327, 327–37 (2012). For a series of 
immediate comments on the decision by numerous commentators, see Lucas Guttentag, Online 
Symposium: Strong on Theory While Profiling Ignored, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2012), http:/ 
/www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-symposium-strong-on-theory-while-profiling-ignored/, and 
related posts.  
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Arizona was a facial challenge by the United States to four 
elements of SB 1070. The contested sections (1) created a state crime 
largely tracking the federal offense of failing to register as an alien;12  
(2) criminalized any attempt by an alien within the state to seek 
unauthorized employment;13 (3) allowed state police officers to arrest 
any person suspected of removability who committed a “public 
offense”;14 and (4) required police to verify the immigration status of 
anyone stopped for other grounds if that person was suspected of 
being present in the country unlawfully.15 The last provision, Section 
2B, dubbed the “show me your papers” law, incited particular criticism 
from civil rights groups for inviting racial and ethnic profiling and 
discrimination.16 
The Court held the first three sections preempted on the grounds 
that they criminalized conduct Congress had chosen not to punish, 
imposed penalties that exceeded federal levels, and required Arizona 
police agencies to arrest and detain individuals whom federal 
authorities might choose not to pursue.17 The Court declined to hold 
Section 2B facially preempted but left open other possible challenges 
to that provision.18 
The precise rationale for invalidating each section differed, but 
the Court generally relied on the federal immigration statute and the 
federal government’s exclusive control and discretion over 
immigration enforcement decisions. The state crime for failing to 
register was held preempted by the federal statute’s “full set of 
standards governing alien registration,” which had been “designed as 
a ‘harmonious whole.’”19 Even complementary state legislation was 
unacceptable because Congress had occupied the field and because 
Arizona’s penalties conflicted with the federal scheme.20 The state 
 
 12.  S.B. 1070 § 3, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509. 
 13.  S.B. 1070 § 5(C), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928. 
 14.  S.B. 1070 § 6, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883. 
 15.  S.B. 1070 § 2(B), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051. 
 16.  See, e.g., SB 1070 at the Supreme Court, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu. 
org/whats-stake-sb-1070-supreme-court-0 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (characterizing § 2(B) as 
“the most hotly disputed” part of SB 1070 and noting that it “invite[d] racial profiling”). See also 
infra note 27. 
 17.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–07 (2012). 
 18.  Id. at 2510. 
 19.  Id. at 2502 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72 (1941)). See also id. at 2530 
(Alito, J., concurring) (finding that federal registration law constitutes “a single integrated and 
all-embracing system,” representing a careful balancing of priorities (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 20.  Id. at 2502–03. 
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crime for engaging in unauthorized employment was held preempted 
on the ground that it conflicted with Congress’s decision to adopt 
comprehensive legislation regulating employers and penalizing their 
hiring of unauthorized immigrant workers—and not to impose 
criminal sanctions on the workers themselves.21 
The third measure, which authorized state officers to arrest, 
without a warrant, any person whom the officer believed to have 
committed “any public offense” that would render him or her 
removable, was held preempted in significant part because the power 
conferred on state officers by SB 1070 exceeded that of federal 
officers under the INA.22 The Court also noted the importance of 
federal enforcement discretion and pointed out that not all aliens 
deemed removable are actually placed into removal proceedings. The 
Court recognized that the federal government’s policy of 
prosecutorial discretion “embraces immediate human concerns” and 
that enforcement priorities reflect multiple considerations and 
individual equities.23 The Court found a lack of federal authorization 
for Arizona’s arrest law and determined that such unilateral state 
authority would upend the discretion properly exercised by the 
federal government, essentially “allow[ing] the state to achieve its 
own immigration policy.”24 The state statute raised serious concerns 
that foreign nationals exempted from enforcement under federal 
 
 21.  Id. at 2504–05. The Arizona decision found federal preemption notwithstanding the 
general police power of states to regulate employment recognized in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 
351 (1976), and the Court’s prior ruling in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 
(2011), which allowed states to revoke the licenses of businesses who knowingly hired 
undocumented workers based on a close (and disputed) reading of a statutory savings clause in 
the INA, id. at 1978. The Court distinguished DeCanas on the ground that although Section 
5(C) aligned with the purpose of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)—
sanctioning unauthorized employment—its means of enforcement did not because it 
criminalized employees and thereby conflicted with Congress’s chosen approach. In Whiting, the 
Court upheld a state law sanctioning businesses that knowingly employed unauthorized aliens. 
Id. at 1987. The law also mandated the use of E-Verify, an electronic database used to 
determine employee eligibility to work in the United States, which federal law makes optional. 
The Court held that the statutory proviso to IRCA’s express preemption provision constituted a 
“savings clause” that authorized Arizona’s license-based scheme. Id. The Court further held 
that the federal statute regulating imposition of E-Verify applied only to the Secretary of DHS 
and that the state requirement was consistent with the federal purpose. See id at 1986. With 
regard to both state mandates, the Court looked to the INA and read the immigration statute as 
permitting— not barring—the state law. Id. 
 22.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505–07. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a) (West 2013) (enumerating the 
powers conferred on any officer and employee of the state that can be exercised without 
requiring a warrant).  
 23.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.  
 24.  Id. at 2506.  
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priorities would be “unnecessar[ily] harass[ed]” by local officials. 25 
The Court did not enjoin the Section 2B provision that required 
state and local police officers to verify the immigration status of 
anyone they stopped if they possessed “reasonable suspicion” that the 
person being detained was an unlawfully present alien.26 The Court 
rejected the United States’s contention that the provision conflicted 
with federal immigration law and did not engage with opponents’ 
concern that the law would invite discriminatory policing based on 
racial profiling.27 The Court found that SB 1070 did not necessarily 
conflict with federal law because state officials are authorized to 
communicate with the federal government about the immigration 
status of detained individuals.28 Section 2B did not interfere with 
prosecutorial discretion because Arizona law did not compel the 
federal government to take action against someone apprehended by 
state authorities.29 
*  *  * 
Arizona’s analytical approach involved a methodical, provision-
by-provision reading of SB 1070 and the federal law governing 
immigration regulation and control. The Court outlined congressional 
intent in the federal immigration statute, the extent to which 
enforcement control was expressly or impliedly reserved to the 
federal government, the potential or actual conflict between federal 
primacy and state authority, and the foreign affairs source for federal 
immigration authority. The analysis turned on the breadth and 
complexity of the federal legislative and regulatory framework, the 
careful balance struck between federal priorities and objectives within 
this framework, and the importance of discretion in immigration 
 
 25.  Id. (noting that allowing state arrest “without any input from the Federal Government 
about whether an arrest is warranted . . . would allow the State to achieve its own immigration 
policy [and t]he result could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens . . . whom federal 
officials determine should not be removed”). 
 26.  Id. at 2507–10. 
 27.  See Brief for Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights et al. at 12, Arizona, 
132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (noting that “[c]itizens of color will disproportionately bear the 
burden of ‘papers please’ policing” and that “racial and ethnic perceptions w[ould] spawn the 
reasonable suspicion that Section 2(B) requires”).  
 28.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 29.  Id. at 2509. The Court further noted that “[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their 
immigration status would raise constitutional concerns.” Id. As I have noted elsewhere, the 
Court imposed important limits on Section 2B’s operation and explicitly noted that its ruling 
“d[id] not mean to ‘foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as 
interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.’” Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra 
note 11, at 13–15 (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510). 
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enforcement. Sprinkled throughout the Arizona opinion are 
references to the “extensive,”30 “comprehensive,”31 and “significant”32 
federal power over immigration. 
Though the Court volubly discussed the immigration power and 
its attendant preemptive force, it defined the federal interest 
principally by dissecting the federal immigration laws governing 
admission, expulsion, enforcement, discretion, and control, i.e., what I 
refer to as the immigration control aspect of federal law. Notably 
absent from the Court’s analysis was SB 1070’s potential to incite 
discrimination and consideration by the Court of an immigrant 
equality component of federal law. In fact, SB 1070’s potentially 
discriminatory effects were affirmatively discounted at oral 
argument.33 
Arizona did not address the prohibition on state “alienage” 
discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1870 as a separate source for 
immigration preemption. The closest the Court came to 
acknowledging the relevance of the Arizona law’s potential 
consequences for immigrants themselves arose in the context of the 
Court’s concern that the state law could lead to harassment of foreign 
nationals by local authorities.34 That in turn could impinge on 
American foreign relations and thereby interfere with the federal 
government’s authority over foreign affairs.35 
This aspect of the Court’s ruling is significant but incomplete. The 
recognition that harassment of immigrants is an important factor to 
consider means that preemption depends on more than a granular 
examination of the INA and that there are federal values at stake 
beyond those embedded in the immigration statutes. However, the 
Court’s concern with potential harassment remained focused on 
preserving the federal government’s own interests and prerogatives. 
The fear of harassment of foreigners arose because it might affect the 
nation’s foreign relations, not because foreign nationals themselves 
 
 30.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 31.  Id. at 2502. 
 32.  Id. at 2510. 
 33.  At oral argument, the Chief Justice sought to cabin off any discussion of 
discrimination-based arguments against SB 1070. At the beginning of his argument, Solicitor 
General Verrilli was immediately asked: “No part of your argument has to do with racial or 
ethnic profiling, does it?” and, “So this is not a case about ethnic profiling.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 34, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) [hereinafter Arizona Oral Argument]. 
 34.  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 35.  Id.  
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are protected against local discrimination as a matter of overriding 
federal law. The Court’s approach omits an important aspect of its 
own preemption jurisprudence that recognizes the deeper claim to 
immigrant equality stemming from the Civil Rights Act of 1870. 
II. ALIENS, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND RECONSTRUCTION 
For nearly a century after adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 
the Supreme Court recognized the principle of immigrant equality as 
part of the federal framework that preempted state or local laws 
denying rights, protections, and benefits to non-citizens. The 1870 Act, 
passed by the Reconstruction Congress, contained express and 
enduring provisions to protect foreign nationals—“aliens”—against 
discrimination.36 These protections form a central part of federal 
policy regarding immigrants and immigration that should be taken 
into account in contemporary Supremacy Clause analysis. Beginning 
with Yick Wo v. Hopkins in 1886 and continuing for nearly ninety 
years through its landmark decision in Graham v. Richardson in 1971, 
the Supreme Court recognized the equality principle embodied in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1870 for its contribution to the preemption of state 
and local immigration measures.37 As the Supremacy Clause now 
reemerges after a lengthy hiatus to serve as a critical limit on state 
immigration authority, restoring the significance of the 1870 Act in the 
federal immigration framework is essential. 
The key provision of the 1870 Act provides in relevant part that 
“all persons” shall have the same right as “white citizens” in “every 
State and Territory” to certain enumerated rights.38 That law is now 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It is part of the larger federal framework 
adopted by Congress in 1870 specifically intended to protect  
non-citizens against sub-federal discrimination. At that time, 
Congress’s focus was particularly on the treatment of Chinese 
immigrants in California, but the Act applied broadly to all non-
citizens. Over the years, the Supreme Court invoked the protections 
of the 1870 Act in preempting discriminatory state and local welfare, 
business, and registration laws that targeted immigrants. The 
 
 36.  Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16–17, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified in part at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). I use the term “alien” throughout this Article to reflect the usage in the 
case law and the text of the 1870 Act. 
       37.    See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1886). 
 38.  Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 16. 
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prohibition against discrimination featured prominently in key 
immigration preemption cases across many decades. The Court 
understood the mandate of non-discrimination as part of the broader 
national policy governing the treatment and rights of non-citizens in 
the United States. This Part first recounts the evolution of the 1870 
Act and traces the alien anti-discrimination provisions from their 
origins through their current codification. I then review the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the alienage provisions in the 1870 Act as an 
important component of the federal framework preempting state and 
local immigration laws. 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1870 and the Protection of Aliens 
The origins of the alien-protection sections of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1870 confirm the Act’s intent to limit state discrimination against 
foreign nationals. The law’s subsequent codification helps explain why 
these protections may today be overlooked in defining the federal 
scheme that sets limits on state and local authority. 
Reconstruction and the civil rights statutes of that era are, of 
course, the subject of vast scholarship.39 But, the fact that this historic 
civil rights legislation also contained important provisions prohibiting 
alienage discrimination and protecting immigrants has not been as 
widely explained. The origins and evolution of the law’s alien-
protecting elements are not fully set forth in the Supreme Court’s 
cases.40 Some scholars have told important aspects of the story as it 
 
 39.  E.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION (2002); PETER CAMEJO, RACISM, 
REVOLUTION, REACTION, 1861-1877: THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 
(1976); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 
(2002); EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2003); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: 
THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (2012); KENNETH 
M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION (1965). These works do not focus on the alienage 
discrimination prohibitions of the 1870 Act or on the development of the Act’s particular 
immigrant-related provisions.    
 40.  I am not aware of any case in which the Court has traced in detail all of the provisions 
in the 1870 Act protecting aliens against discrimination. The Court has examined the origins of 
one key part, Section 16 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981), in relation to race discrimination 
claims in various cases. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) 
(holding that § 1981 as amended applies to retaliation claims); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. 
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (holding that § 1981 only prohibits intentional 
discrimination); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (holding that 
§ 1981 reaches private discrimination against white persons); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 
172 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to discriminatory admission practices of private schools); 
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948) (holding that Section 16 prohibits enforcement of 
restrictive racial covenants); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77–79 (1917) (holding that 
Section 16 contravened a racially discriminatory municipal ordinance). With the exception of 
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relates to discrimination against Chinese immigrants,41 but their work 
does not examine the centrality of the 1870 Act in the particular 
context of immigration federalism and federal preemption of state 
alienage laws.42 Revisiting the origins, text, and codification of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1870 helps illuminate the Act as an important 
source for understanding federal policies and interests regarding 
immigrants and immigration. 
1. Enactment During Reconstruction 
a. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 
Exploring the federal prohibitions against state alienage 
discrimination begins with the Civil Rights Acts of 1866. The 1866 Act, 
which itself addressed only race and citizenship, is the essential 
starting point because it enacted a template that became the model 
for addressing alienage discrimination a few years later. 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
(in April 1866 over President Johnson’s veto)43 to enforce the rights of 
newly freed slaves under the recently-ratified Thirteenth 
Amendment.44 The Fourteenth Amendment was considered by the 
 
the cases I discuss in the text, the Court has addressed the 1870 Act’s application to alienage 
discrimination only indirectly. See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 193–204 (White, J., dissenting) 
(noting, in consideration of the legislative history, that “one of the classes of persons for whose 
benefit the statute was intended was aliens”); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 n.10 
(1941) (explaining, in discussing another section, that the claimed purpose “was to extend [the 
Civil Rights Act’s] benefits to aliens”). 
 41.  See CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994); Charles McClain, Jr., 
The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 
72 CALIF. L. REV. 529 (1984). See also Stephen Knight, The First Time as Tragedy, The Second 
Time as Farce: Proposition 187, Section 1981 and the Rights of Aliens, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 
289 (1997). See generally GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: 
THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 80–83 (2013). 
 42.  My analysis considers the existing historical sources and scholarship to examine the 
importance of the 1870 Act in relation to the contemporary debate over immigration federalism 
and preemption. I do not undertake an independent examination of the history of the alienage 
provisions in the 1870 Act or the motivations of its proponents. For now, my purpose is simply 
to show the significance of the alien-protection provisions specifically to preemption. My initial 
thoughts appear in Guttentag, Discrimination, supra note ∗. The existing literature on the 1870 
Act’s prohibition against alienage discrimination focuses on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 without 
considering its relevance to federal preemption. See, e.g., Aaron Danzinger, The Scope of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981: Protection Against Private Alien Age Discrimination, 11 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 527 
(1997); Angela M. Ford, Private Alienage Discrimination and the Reconstruction Amendments: 
The Constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 457 (2001); Knight, supra note 41. 
       43.    Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 29. 
 44.  See CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). 
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same Congress and approved for submission to the states that June, 
but it was not ratified until July 1868.45 
The key parts of the 1866 Act for present purposes are the second 
clause of Section 1 and the entirety of Section 2. In Section 1, 
Congress first ensured citizenship for all persons born in the United 
States.46 The second clause of Section 1 then mandated equality 
between white and non-white citizens with respect to a range of civil 
and economic rights enumerated in the statute.47 It required that 
“all . . . citizens” be treated the same as “white citizens” in designated 
respects. Section 2 then further addressed racial discrimination by 
imposing criminal penalties for deprivation of rights or disparate 
punishments based on race or prior condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude.48 That provision imposed a fine and 
 
 45.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148–49 (1866); Proclamation No. 13, 15 Stat. 
708, 711 (July 28, 1868). As scholars and the Court have long noted, the 1866 Act and the 
Fourteenth Amendment are closely intertwined. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31–33 (1948) 
(showing how the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment “were closely related both in 
inception and in the objectives which Congress sought to achieve”); HORACE EDGAR FLACK, 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94–97 (photo. reprint 1965) (1908) 
(arguing that a primary reason for the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to set the 
1866 Act on more solid constitutional footing). 
 46.  The first clause of Section 1 addressed citizenship in language very similar to that in 
the later Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, cl. 1 (“Be it enacted by 
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding 
Indians, not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”), with U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). See 
generally GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006) (describing the “battle” over 
the Fourteenth Amendment and how the Amendment changed the country). 
 47.  Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, cl. 2. The first clause of Section 1 provided:  
[A]nd such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.  
Id. at cl. 1. 
 48.  Id. § 2. The full text of Section 2 of the 1866 Act read:  
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any 
inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or 
protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such 
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or 
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imprisonment (up to a year) on any person who, under color of law or 
custom, deprived any inhabitant of enumerated rights or imposed 
“punishments, pains or penalties” different than on a “white person[]” 
because of a person’s former slave status or “by reason of his color or 
race.”49 
b. The 1870 Act 
In May 1870, Congress enacted further civil rights legislation. The 
Voting Rights Enforcement Act, commonly referred to as the 
Enforcement Act of 1870 or the Civil Rights Act of 1870,50 was 
adopted after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had come 
into force (in July 1868 and February 1870, respectively).51 The 1870 
Act, although largely focused on voting rights, contained three distinct 
substantive provisions aimed at discrimination against non-citizens. 
The key protections appeared in Sections 16 and 17. These were 
modified versions of Sections 1 and 2 of the recently-adopted 1866 
Act. But the new statutes were expanded to encompass discrimination 
against non-citizens, i.e., “alienage” discrimination. 
The “Alien” Provisions—Sections 16 and 17. Sections 16 and 17 
of the 1870 Act enacted a broad measure of equality between citizens 
and aliens in “every State and Territory.”52 These provisions (along 
with what became Section 18) originated in a separate bill, S.365, 
introduced in 1870 by Senator William Morris Stewart of Nevada.53 
 
by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, 
in the discretion of the court.  
Id. 
 49.  Id. The remaining sections of the 1866 Act enforced its principal provisions but did not 
directly bear on later developments protecting non-citizens. Sections 3 through 10 addressed 
enforcement and jurisdictional issues. Section 3 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the federal 
courts; Section 4 gave enforcement powers to United States attorneys and marshals; Section 5 
imposed certain duties on those officers to execute warrants; Section 6 made it a crime to 
interfere with the officers’ duties; Section 7 provided payment to the officers; Section 8 allowed 
the President to assign officers to locations where they were needed; Section 9 authorized the 
President to deploy military forces to enforce the Act; and Section 10 provided for Supreme 
Court review. Id. §§ 3–10. 
 50. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (“An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens 
of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other Purposes.”). 
 51.  FLACK, supra note 45, at 223–24.  
 52.  Civil Rights Act of 1870 §§ 16–17. 
 53.  See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 323 (1870) (introducing S.365). Justice White 
refers to S.365 in his Runyon dissent, but focuses on what became Section 16 of the 1870 Act. 
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 195–201 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (citing S.365 in 
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Stewart’s stated purpose for S.365 was to extend the protections of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to aliens: “The original [1866] civil rights 
bill protected all persons born in the United States in the equal 
protection of the laws. This bill extends it to aliens, so that all persons 
who are in the United States shall have the equal protection of our 
laws.”54 Stewart’s original bill had three sections, which were 
subsequently inserted virtually verbatim into the bill that became the 
Civil Rights Act of 1870.55 Stewart was particularly concerned with 
addressing the discrimination and abuse visited upon Chinese 
nationals in California and the West: “If the State courts do not give 
them the equal protection of the law, if public sentiment is so 
inhuman as to rob them of their ordinary civil rights, . . . I would be 
 
noting the origins of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).  
 54.  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart).  
 55.  See id. (recording the text of the Stewart Bill). The entirety of S.365 provided:  
Be it enacted, &c., That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, Indians 
not taxed excepted, shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the 
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, 
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. No tax or 
charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person emigrating thereto 
from a foreign country which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every person 
emigrating to such State from any other foreign country, and any law of any State in 
conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void. 
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant 
of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this 
act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person being an 
alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white 
persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or 
both, in the discretion of the court. 
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United 
States in their civil rights and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April 9, 
1866, is hereby reenacted, and said act, except the first and second sections thereof, is 
hereby referred to and made a part of this act. 
Id. S.365 had been progressing separately since January 10, 1870 until Senator Stewart proposed 
it as an amendment to the voting rights bill in May of 1870. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 323 (1870) (introducing S.365). See also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3480 (1870) 
(showing the movement to amend the voting rights bill to add S.365). Between Stewart’s 
introduction and passage of the 1870 Act, a few modest changes in the language of the 
provisions occurred. The original S.365 introduced by Senator Stewart excluded “Indians not 
taxed” from the protections of Section 1, but that stipulation was omitted when S.365 was made 
a part of the 1870 Act. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870), with Civil 
Rights Act of 1870 § 16. The criminal provision forbidding differential punishment for aliens 
and “white persons” was modified to forbid differential punishment for aliens and “citizens.” 
Compare CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870), with Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17. 
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less than a man if I did not insist . . . that that provision shall go on 
this bill.”56 
The two alienage provisions of the 1870 Act provided as follows: 
[Section 16:] [A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the 
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed 
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none 
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the 
contrary notwithstanding. No tax or charge shall be imposed or 
enforced by any State upon any person immigrating thereto from a 
foreign country which is not equally imposed and enforced upon 
every person immigrating to such State from any other foreign 
country; and any law of any State in conflict with this provision is 
hereby declared null and void.57 
[Section 17:] And be it further enacted, That any person who, 
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State 
or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by 
the last preceding section of this act, or to different punishment, 
pains, or penalties on account of such person being an alien, or by 
reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of 
citizens, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on 
conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand 
dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the 
 
 56.  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart). See also 
id. at 3807 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“I congratulate the country, particularly [for] those 
provisions which extend the strong arm of the Government to the protection of the Chinese; 
those provisions which protect those industrious, helpless people whom we have invited to our 
shores . . . .”). The story of Senator Stewart, his goal of addressing discrimination against 
Chinese immigrants in California, the evolution of S.365, its inclusion in the Voting Rights Act, 
and the role of the San Francisco Chinese community in pursuing this legislation are recounted 
in fascinating detail by Charles McClain. MCCLAIN, supra note 41. See generally LUCY E. 
SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN 
IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). To acknowledge Stewart’s role in sponsoring these protections is 
not to express a view on his motivation. McClain recognizes a confluence of interests between 
the Chinese who sought to protect themselves against discrimination and the “Caucasian 
business community” that viewed them as a source of labor. McClain, Jr., supra note 41, at 534 
n.22 (1984) (“Some evidence suggests that Chinese community leaders saw some, though by no 
means all, leaders of the Caucasian business community as natural allies and worked with them 
when that appeared to inure to their own benefit.”).  
 57.  Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 16. 
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discretion of the court.58 
First Sentence of Section 16. The first sentence of Section 16 is the 
most well-known of the Act’s provisions. Today it is codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981. The language of Section 16 was patterned directly on 
Section 1 of the 1866 Act with a critical difference. The new Section 
16 provided that “all persons” (instead of only “citizens”) be treated 
the same as “white citizens.”59 It thereby went significantly beyond 
prohibiting discrimination between white and non-white citizens. By 
requiring equality between persons and citizens, Section 16 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of citizenship, or as it came to 
be called, on the basis of alienage. 
Section 16 differed in two other notable respects from the earlier 
1866 Act with regard to the particular areas of non-discrimination 
listed in the statute. Section 16 added “taxes, licenses and exactions” 
to the list of activities for which discrimination was barred, and the 
law omitted the right “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey 
real and personal property” from its coverage.60 In short, the effect of 
Section 16 was to prohibit discrimination both on the basis of alienage 
(persons versus white citizens) and on the basis of race (persons 
versus white citizens) as to the lengthy list of civil and economic rights 
specified in the law, but with the important exception of property 
rights. 
Discrimination with regard to property rights continued to be 
prohibited by the earlier Section 1 from the 1866 Act. But that section 
governed property discrimination only for citizens and only with 
respect to race.61 Alienage discrimination was not encompassed by the 
 
 58.  Id. § 17. 
 59.  Id. § 16. 
 60.  Compare id. § 16 (encompassing the right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and also mandating that 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States “be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other” (emphasis added)), with 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, cl. 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (encompassing the right “to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and also mandating that all 
citizens “be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other” (emphasis 
added)). See also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart) 
(“If the Senator will examine this bill in connection with the original civil rights bill, he will see 
that it has no reference to inheriting or holding real estate.”). 
 61.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
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earlier law, and hence aliens were not entitled to equality as to 
property rights under the statute.62 
Second Sentence of Section 16. The second sentence of Section 16 
was also directly addressed at discriminatory practices affecting non-
citizens—but with the particular aim of preventing state 
discrimination among different immigrant groups. The provision 
prohibited any state from imposing or enforcing any tax or charge on 
any person immigrating to the state from a foreign country if that tax 
was not “equally imposed” on every person immigrating “from any 
other foreign country.”63 
Section 17. Section 17 of the 1870 Act imposed criminal penalties 
for alienage discrimination by enacting language that closely tracked 
but significantly expanded the criminal prohibitions originally 
enacted by Section 2 of the 1866 Act. The 1866 Act had criminalized 
the differential imposition of “punishment, pains, or penalties” based 
on “color or race” or prior slavery.64 The new law explicitly expanded 
the scope of the prohibition by also outlawing differential treatment 
“on account of such person being an alien.”65 
In addition, Section 17 changed the category of persons whose 
treatment set the equality baseline to which others were entitled. The 
1866 Act provided that others be treated the same as “white 
persons.”66 Section 17 instead required that everyone be treated 
 
 62.  The omission regarding property equality under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 may help 
to explain the subsequent general acceptance of state laws discriminating against non-citizens in 
land inheritance and ownership in the era before Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366–68 
(1971). See infra note 106 (discussing property discrimination cases).  
 63.  See supra text accompanying note 57. This provision has been largely forgotten as it 
was repealed in 1952. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 403(a)(1), 66 
Stat. 163, 279 (1952) (repealing the tax provision of Section 16).  
 64.  Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2. 
 65.  Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 58. 
The Supreme Court has read this section as authorizing punishment of anyone for either 
“willfully subjecting any inhabitant to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution” or 
for “willfully subjecting any inhabitant to different punishments on account of his color or race 
[or alienage] than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens.” United States v. Classic, 313 
U.S. 299, 327 (1941).  
 66.  Both Section 2 (from 1866) and Section 17 (from 1870) referred to every “inhabitant” 
of any “State or Territory” being protected against deprivation of rights on account of any such 
“person” being an alien or by reason of his color. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2, with 
Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17. I am not aware of any congressional discussion of the reason for 
using the term “inhabitant.” The term also appears in the earlier laws restricting immigration 
from China (and later extended) presumably to broaden the scope of the restriction. See infra 
note 78. As noted below, these terms were changed in the 1875 codification and again in 1994 by 
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equally with “citizens.” The statute thus juxtaposed all persons (or 
inhabitants) with citizens thereby underscoring that discriminatory 
treatment of non-citizens was impermissible.67 
Section 18. Section 18 reenacted the entire Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and specified that Sections 16 and 17 (the alienage provisions) 
“be enforced pursuant to the provisions of said act.”68 
In sum, the 1870 Act enumerated specified rights and commanded 
equality between citizens and non-citizens, outlawed differential entry 
taxes based on nationality or country of origin, and imposed criminal 
penalties for subjecting a person to discriminatory punishment “on 
account of . . . being an alien.” Congress expressly barred 
discrimination between citizens and aliens using the same categorical 
language that it had initially deployed to condemn discrimination 
based on race or color in the 1866 Act. The Civil Rights Act of 1870 
thus enacted an emphatic federal prohibition against alienage 
discrimination by states in critical areas of public life. 
2. The Subsequent Codification 
Between the adoption of the Act in 1870 and today’s codification 
of its provisions, the protections for non-citizens that Congress 
enacted have appeared in different titles and chapters of the federal 
code. This process, and the disaggregation of the 1870 Act into 
separate statutes, has somewhat obscured the Act’s importance to 
immigration discrimination and its relevance to federal preemption.69 
 
congressional amendment. See infra notes 81 and 84 and accompanying text. 
 67.  Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2, with Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 17. Section 17 
also omitted the earlier reference to previous condition of slavery (perhaps because that was 
assumed to be encompassed in the race and color protection). 
 68.  Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 18. Section 18 reads in its entirety: 
And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United States in 
their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, 
eighteen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and 
seventeen hereof shall be enforced according to the provisions of said act. 
Id. Scholars assume that the reenactment was intended to ensure that the 1866 Act was 
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Thirteenth to address concerns about 
the earlier law’s constitutionality. See FLACK, supra note 45, at 224; George Rutherglen, The 
Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 313 
(2003); Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and 
Antidiscrimination for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 188 (2006). No 
rationale is presented in the debates, however. See FLACK, supra note 45, at 224 (“[I]t is strange 
that no reference was made as to this purpose.”). The Thirteenth Amendment foundation for 
Section 16 supported its application to private discrimination. See infra notes 72 and 172. 
 69.  A schematic flow chart depicting the origins and codifications appears infra at pp. 26. 
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a. 1875 Revised Statutes  
Soon after the 1870 Act, a codification of federal law occurred. 
The Revised Statutes of 187570 synthesized and consolidated the 
federal laws enacted by Congress into a comprehensive collection for 
the first time.71 This has particular relevance because elements of 
Sections 1 and 2 of the 1866 Act and of Sections 16 and 17 of the 1870 
Act were combined in the codification process.72 After this 1875 
codification, the location of the different statutes changed over the 
years, but the operative language of the key provisions (relating to the 
aspects at issue here) remained largely unaltered, with a few 
exceptions that are detailed below. 
In the 1875 codification, the overlapping prohibitions enacted in 
Section 1 of the 1866 Act and reenacted more expansively by the first 
sentence of Section 16 of the 1870 Act were codified in the “Civil 
Rights” title of the Revised Statutes.73 The core requirement of 
equality between “persons” and “white citizens” (with regard to 
enumerated rights) established by Section 16 became Revised 
Statutes Section 1977.74 That language has remained intact ever since.75 
 
 70.  This codification is often referred to as the “Revised Statutes of 1874.” I have chosen 
to use “Revised Statutes of 1875” following the date of publication (rather than enactment) of 
the original edition. See Hamilton Fish, Certification of THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1875). This comports with the naming system of the Library of 
Congress, Federal Statutes: Subject Arrangement of Statutes, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2013), as well as some other publications, 
e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 41, at 68 (1996); DAVID SCHULTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
LAW 443 (2009); RICHARD STEVEN STREET, BEASTS OF THE FIELD: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 
OF CALIFORNIA FARM WORKERS, 1769-1913 349 (2004). 
 71.  See Roy G. Fitzgerald, Preface to THE CODE OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (1926).  
 72.  This has engendered controversy over the constitutional foundations of the provisions 
and the intentional or inadvertent consequences of the codification process. There is 
disagreement over whether § 1981 was grounded in the 1866 Act to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment—thereby reaching private conduct—or only in the 1870 Act pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby limited to state action. Compare Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (stating that § 1981 “constitutes an exercise of federal legislative power 
under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment”), with Runyon, 427 U.S. at 205–07 (White, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that § 1981 derives only from the 1870 Act and the Fourteenth 
Amendment). That disagreement has been superseded by the amendments enacted by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 and, in any case, does not matter for the essential point here: that Congress 
intended to protect aliens, at a minimum, against discriminatory state laws. See infra note 172. 
 73.  Revised Statutes, tit. 24, §§ 1977–78, 18 Stat. 1, 348 (1874). 
 74.  Id. § 1977. 
 75.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2013) (using the same language as Section 1977). Section 
1977 of the Revised Statutes provided:  
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
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The requirement of racial equality for all citizens with regard to 
property rights appeared only in Section 1 of the 1866 Act. It was 
culled from the 1866 Act language and separately codified in Section 
1978, immediately adjacent to the codification of Section 16.76 
The second sentence of Section 16 (from 1870), which prohibited 
discrimination among aliens in state landing taxes based on country of 
origin, was codified in an entirely different location under the 
“Immigration” title at Section 2164.77 It appeared alongside provisions 
of the so-called “Anti-Coolie Act,” which restricted the entry of 
certain Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian immigrants into the 
United States.78 This underscores the broader point that federal law 
simultaneously authorized federal classifications while outlawing state 
discrimination on the same or similar grounds. 
The third prohibition in the 1870 Act—Section 17’s criminalizing 
of discrimination against persons on account of race, color, or “being 
an alien”—was combined with other enactments and codified at 
Section 5510 as part of the “Crimes” title.79 Although Section 5510 
 
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other.  
Revised Statutes § 1977. Later amendments added provisions to the statute but did not alter this 
text. 
 76.  Revised Statutes § 1978. Section 1978 provided: “All citizens of the United States shall 
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” Id. Today that 
provision is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 
 77.  See id. § 2164 (codifying the second sentence of Section 16). Section 2164 provided: 
“No tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person immigrating 
thereto from a foreign country, which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every person 
immigrating to such State from any other foreign country.” Id. 
 78.  See id. §§ 2158–63 (showing sections derived from An Act to prohibit the ‘Coolie 
Trade’ by American Citizens in American Vessels, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862)). The 1862 “Anti-
Coolie” Act initially applied only to “inhabitants or subjects of China.” An Act to prohibit the 
‘Coolie Trade’ § 1. It was amended in 1869 to extend to “Japan or any other oriental country.” 
Act of Feb. 9, 1869, ch. 24, 15 Stat. 269 (1869). See generally infra note 187. 
 79.  See Revised Statutes § 5510. The marginalia to Section 5510 in the Revised Statutes 
state that the section was derived from Section 17 of the 1870 Act. Section 5510 is probably 
more properly considered an amalgamation of criminal provisions of the 1866 Act, the 1870 Act, 
and the 1871 “Ku Klux Klan” Act, as the Supreme Court has suggested. See Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1945) (noting the various historical sources of the law). Section 5510 
criminalizes, in addition to conduct proscribed in Section 17, the deprivation of “privileges, or 
immunities” secured by the “Constitution and laws of the United States,” which had been 
prohibited by the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 
13 (“[A]ny person who . . . shall subject . . . any person within the jurisdiction of the United 
States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States . . . shall . . . be liable” to the injured party (emphasis added)). 
Representative Lawrence stated quite explicitly that the statute as proposed in Thomas 
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largely followed the language of its sources, the codifiers changed the 
phrase “on account of such person being an alien”80 to “on account of 
such an inhabitant being an alien,” tracking the use of “inhabitant” 
earlier in the same section.81 The change was presumptively non-
substantive and presumably intended for symmetry.82 But courts 
nonetheless scrutinized the use of “inhabitant” in later years (and 
applied it broadly).83 In 1994 Congress changed both instances of 
“inhabitant” to “person” to remove any doubt about the 
expansiveness of its coverage.84 
In sum, by 1875, the various overlapping and distinct elements of 
Sections 1 and 2 (from 1866) and Sections 16 and 17 (from 1870) were 
codified into four separate statutes:  
• Most of Section 1 (from 1866) and Section 16 (from 1870) 
appeared in Section 1977, requiring equality of specified 
rights between persons and white citizens (the alien non-
discrimination provision). 
• The original portion of Section 1 (from 1866) addressing 
property rights of citizens—that was not encompassed by 
Section 16 (from 1870)—was codified separately in Section 
1978 (the citizen property discrimination provision). 
 
 
Jefferson Durant’s revision, which was ultimately adopted verbatim, “condenses into one the 
three criminal sections” of the 1866, 1870, and 1871 Acts. 2 CONG. REC. 828 (1874). 
       80.    Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 17, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (emphasis added). 
 81.  Revised Statutes § 5510 (emphasis added). 
 82.  Any substantive change to the law would have run counter to the professed aim of the 
codifiers. See 2 CONG. REC. 129 (1873) (statement of Rep. Butler) (“We have not attempted to 
change the law, in a single word or letter, so as to make a different reading or different sense. 
All that has been done is to strike out the obsolete parts and to condense and consolidate and 
bring together statutes in pari materia . . . .”). 
 83.  For example, courts of appeals analyzed the term in determining the extent to which 
the statute might protect unlawfully present aliens. See United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 
243 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the presence of an “illegal alien” “was sufficiently permanent 
for her to qualify as an inhabitant under the statute”); United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 
227 (1st Cir. 1990) (“We can understand how one might bring an ‘illegal alien,’ intending to stay 
in the country for some time, within the scope of the word ‘inhabitant.’”); United States v. 
Otherson, 637 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he term ‘inhabitant’ as used in [S]ection 242 
does include all persons, without exception, present within the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”).  
 84.  See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 
320201(b)(2), 108 Stat. 1796 (striking references to “inhabitant” and inserting the term 
“person”); cf. 137 CONG. REC. 3191 (1991) (indicating that the intent of the change from 
“inhabitant” to “person” was “to ensure protection of all persons within the United States by 
these important provisions of the federal civil rights laws, regardless of whether they are 
‘inhabitants’”). 
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• The second sentence of Section 16 (from 1870) prohibiting 
discriminatory landing taxes appeared in Section 2164 (the 
landing tax provision). 
• The expanded criminal provision of Section 17 (from 
1870) prohibiting differential punishment on account of a 
person’s “being an alien,” and encompassing the former 
Section 2 (from 1866) (as well elements of the 1871 Ku 
Klux Klan Act) appeared in Section 551085 (the criminal 
alien discrimination provision). 
b. Later Changes: 1926 Codifications  
Over the next seventy-five years, the statutes eventually settled 
into their present location. Of particular interest, from 1926 until 1952 
the alien non-discrimination provision codified at Section 1977 (from 
Section 16) appeared as part of the “Aliens and Citizenship” 
immigration laws in Title 8 of the United States Code.86 
In 1926, the publication of the United States Code placed Section 
1977 (prohibiting alienage discrimination) among the immigration 
laws at 8 U.S.C. § 41. The related Section 1978 (protecting property 
rights for citizens) was kept adjacent and codified at 8 U.S.C. § 42. The 
two sections were a part of the “Civil Rights” chapter of the Aliens 
and Citizenship Title 8.87 Both provisions remained a part of the 
Immigration title for more than a quarter-century. 
The 1926 reorganization also renumbered the landing tax 
provision; what was once in Section 16, and then codified at Section 
2164 in 1875, became Section 135 under the “Aliens and Citizenship” 
title in the “Immigration” chapter.88 It was later repealed in 1952 by 
the INA, which rendered that section superfluous.89 
 
 85.  See supra note 79 (discussing the roots of Section 5510). 
 86.  In 1926, the United States Code was published (prepared by private publishers under 
the supervision of House and Senate committees). See Fitzgerald, supra note 71 (“Under the 
auspices of the committees of the House and the Senate the actual work of assembling and 
classifying the mass of material has been done by the West Publishing Co. and the Edward 
Thompson Co.”). 
 87.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 41–43 (1926) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83). Today’s 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 appeared at 8 U.S.C. § 43, and was previously Section 1979 of the Revised 
Statutes, which derived from Section 1 of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See supra note 79. See 
also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 204 (1961) (tracing the origins of the provision).  
 88.  See 18 U.S.C. § 135 (1926) (repealed 1952) (incorporating the landing tax provision). 
 89.  See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 403(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 279 
(1952) (repealing Section 135). The 1952 notes to Title 8 explain that Section 135 was now 
covered in subchapter II of chapter 12, which contained provisions of the new INA. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 135 (1926) (repealed 1952) (showing the relocation). 
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Lastly, the 1926 codification moved the criminal provisions 
(originating in Section 17 of the 1870 Act) codified at Section 5510 in 
1875, to Section 52 of Title 18, the Crimes title.90 Unlike the other 
sections, it had undergone an interim move in 1909 to section 20 of 
the Federal Penal Code.91 In 1948, Section 52 was renumbered as 
Section 242, where it remains today.92 
c. 1952  
The most recent changes in the statutes’ locations occurred in 
1952 when Congress enacted the INA.93 That overhaul of federal 
immigration law prompted further reorganization of the United 
States Code. The two civil rights provisions derived from the 1866 and 
1870 Acts were moved out of the Immigration title (Title 8) and into 
the Health and Welfare title (Title 42). They became, respectively, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, where they have remained ever since.94 
*  *  * 
The chart below schematically portrays the evolving placement of 
the 1870 Act’s immigration provisions culminating in the current 
codification of Sections 16 and 17 at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 18 U.S.C. § 
242. 
The disaggregation, fragmentation, and transient codification of 
the protections for non-citizens in the 1870 Act that began with the 
1875 codification process and continued with the subsequent 
scattering of the various provisions through the United States Code 
may help explain why the Supreme Court gradually lost sight of the 
broader significance of the 1870 Act as a whole. The codification 
process separated the parts of the Act from each other thereby 
diminishing the more encompassing nature of Senator Stewart’s 
original bill and the relevant provisions of the 1870 Act. Section 17 
 
 90.  See 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1926) (repealed 1948). 
 91.  See Penal Code of 1909, ch. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1088, 1092. 
 92.  See Act of Jan. 6, 1948, ch. 645, § 242, 62 Stat. 683, 696; 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1926) 
(repealed 1948) (containing the same content).  
 93.  Immigration and Nationality Act. 
 94.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 41–43 (1952) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83) (indicating 
transfer); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981–82 (West 2013) (containing the same content). The legislative 
sources do not reveal a reason for the shift in location. In 1991, § 1981 underwent a final 
significant substantive expansion to clarify the reach of the term “make and enforce contracts” 
and to specify that the statute covered non-governmental private discrimination as well as 
action under color of state law. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 
Stat. 1071. See generally CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008) (recounting 
enactment of 1991 Civil Rights Act amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
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(which criminalized forms of alienage discrimination) and the now-
repealed landing tax prohibition became separated from the non-
discrimination provision of Section 16, obscuring their shared history 
and broader goal of equality. 
In addition, the central protections of Section 16 disappeared from 
the Immigration title when they were moved in 1952. After the 
codification of 1926, when the discrimination prohibition appeared in 
the federal scheme regulating—and protecting—immigrants, the 
immigration nexus was more immediately apparent. Transferring 
Section 16 out of the Immigration title of the Code in 1952 may have 
eventually clouded its origins as part of a broader framework that 
Congress enacted along with Section 17 to protect non-citizens 
against state alienage discrimination. 
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Figure 1 
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B. The Court’s Immigration Preemption Decisions and the 1870 Act 
For many decades following the enactment of the 1870 Civil 
Rights Act, the Supreme Court recognized the Act as a component of 
the federal structure that protects immigrants against state 
discrimination. The Court consciously invoked the Act in defining the 
federal law and federal interests that preempted state measures under 
the Supremacy Clause. The Act’s provisions informed the Court’s 
understanding of the broad federal framework governing the rights of 
immigrants and barring inconsistent state laws. The principal rulings 
in which the Court recognized Section 16 as part of a comprehensive 
federal scheme regulating and protecting aliens are Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, Hines v. Davidowitz,95 Takahashi v. California Fish & Game 
Commission,96 and Graham v. Richardson. 
The 1870 Act first played a prominent role in defining the scope of 
federal law with the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins. In Yick Wo, 
the Court struck down sub-federal restrictions on aliens on the 
ground—for the first time—that the laws constituted impermissible 
discrimination.97 The case famously held that San Francisco laundry 
ordinances, although neutral on their face, discriminated 
impermissibly against Chinese immigrants in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because “in their administration” they were 
“applied and administered” with “an evil eye and unequal hand.”98 
The Court prominently relied on the 1870 Civil Rights Act in 
support of its ruling.99 Although it recognized that plaintiffs were 
“aliens and subjects of the emperor of China,”100 the Court 
nonetheless found that they were within the protections of the 
 
 95.  312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 96.  334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
 97.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). Before Yick Wo, the Court had struck 
down some sub-federal laws governing foreign nationals on the ground that they constituted 
impermissible regulation of immigration. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277, 280–81 
(1875) (holding that a California statute imposing state fees to control entry of paupers, 
criminals, and other undesirable immigrants constituted unconstitutional regulation of 
immigration); Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (invalidating a similar 
New York statute on the same grounds). The Court had also upheld other laws as permissible 
exercises of local power. See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 707, 711 (1885) (holding that a 
San Francisco ordinance limiting working hours in laundries was a valid exercise of police 
power); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30 (1884) (holding that a related San Francisco 
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power).  
 98.  Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74. 
 99.  Id. at 369.  
 100.  Id. at 368.  
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Constitution—and of the Civil Rights Act of 1870.101 The Court recited 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and affirmed that “[t]hese provisions are universal in 
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, 
without regard to any difference of race, of color, or of nationality.”102 
The Court went on to quote the key protection of Section 16 of the 
1870 Act (by then codified at Section 1977): 
It is accordingly enacted by section 1977 of the Revised Statutes 
that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right, in every state and territory, to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and 
exactions of every kind, and to no other.”103 
The Court strongly emphasized the equality principle embedded 
in the Act. It stressed that under the law the “rights of every citizen” 
must be viewed “equally with those of the strangers and aliens” 
seeking the Court’s protection.104 The Court ultimately ruled that the 
law was based on “hostility to the race and nationality” of the 
plaintiffs, violating equal protection.105 But the opinion laid the 
foundation for the 1870 Act’s preeminence with regard to alienage 
discrimination. 
In subsequent cases, Yick Wo’s understanding about the scope and 
importance of the 1870 Civil Rights Act became central when the 
Court considered immigration preemption and the protection 
afforded by federal law. The language from Yick Wo and the 
invocation of Section 16 appeared in key cases where the Court 
struck down state laws solely on federal preemption grounds.106 
 
 101.  Id. at 369. 
 102.  Id. (emphasis added). See also id. (“The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is 
not confined to the protection of citizens.”). 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. at 374.  
 106.  After Yick Wo, the Court considered a number of cases challenging state or local laws 
discriminating on the basis of alienage without considering Section 16. Most of these cases 
concerned inheritance or ownership of real property, an area specifically carved out of Section 
16 of the 1870 Act. Those restrictions were permitted unless the Court found them prohibited 
by treaty or as discriminating against United States citizens (not aliens) based on nationality. 
Compare Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 261–63 (1925) (upholding the discriminatory 
presumption created by the California Alien Land Law), and Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 
197, 223–24 (1923) (upholding the Washington Alien Land Law, which restricted alien land 
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In Hines v. Davidowitz, which Arizona cites prominently,107 the 
Court invalidated a Pennsylvania alien registration law.108 Hines 
concerned Pennsylvania’s 1939 law requiring aliens to register 
annually and to provide specified information to the state.109 The 
plaintiffs claimed that the state law conflicted with a number of 
constitutional rights and federal provisions, including Section 16 of 
the 1870 Act (by then codified at 8 U.S.C. § 41).110 
The Court expressly left open all other claims and ruled only on 
the plaintiffs’ federal preemption claim.111 The opinion concluded that 
the state law was preempted by the recently enacted federal 
registration regime.112 In doing so, the Court, with Justice Black 
 
ownership), and Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding the California Alien 
Land Law, which restricted alien land ownership), and Petersen v. Iowa, 245 U.S. 170, 175 
(1917) (upholding a discriminatory Iowa inheritance tax), and Duus v. Brown, 245 U.S. 176, 
177–78 (1917) (same), with Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 636, 644–47 (1948) (holding a 
state land restriction unconstitutional as applied to an American citizen born to Japanese 
parents), and Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 57–58 (1929) (holding that a treaty with Denmark 
rendered Iowa’s inheritance tax on Danish citizen unlawful), and De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 
258, 272–73 (1890) (holding that a treaty with France rendered the District of Columbia’s 
restriction on French citizen’s inheritance unlawful). Other cases were decided under the Equal 
Protection Clause (without mention of preemption or the 1870 Civil Rights Act) under the then-
prevailing view that public goods, employment, and resources could be reserved to United 
States citizens. See, e.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 176–77, 194 (1915) (upholding a New 
York law restricting public works hiring to citizens); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 
(1915) (upholding a law criminalizing the hiring of aliens for public works); Patsone v. 
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143–45 (1914) (upholding a law forbidding aliens from owning a 
shotgun or rifle and from “kill[ing] any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or 
property”). Interference with private employment was struck down on equal protection 
grounds. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40–43 (1915) (holding unconstitutional an 
Arizona law imposing a general quota on the employment of lawfully admitted aliens). In Ohio 
v. Deckerbach, the Court upheld an Ohio law prohibiting aliens from operating pool halls, areas 
known for vice and corruption, as “rational” without mention of Section 16. 274 U.S. 392, 397 
(1927). In 1971, Graham v. Richardson revolutionized the level of scrutiny applicable to state 
alienage discrimination, rendering obsolete and invalid most of the discriminatory laws that had 
previously been allowed. 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“[C]lassifications based on alienage, like 
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 107.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–03 (2012) (explaining Hines).  
 108.  312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).  
 109.  Id. at 59.  
 110.  Plaintiffs argued that the state law violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 16 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, exceeded Pennsylvania’s constitutional power absent 
congressional consent, and was precluded by the comprehensive federal alien registration 
scheme. Id. at 61 & n.7 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144) 
(reciting Section 16 in its entirety). The Solicitor General’s amicus brief on behalf of the United 
States supported plaintiffs’ argument that the Pennsylvania statute was invalid under Section 16 
of the 1870 Civil Rights Act. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 43–49, Hines, 312 U.S. 52 (No. 22).  
 111.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 62.  
 112.  Id. at 74.  
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writing, conducted “an examination of congressional enactments” to 
determine whether Congress has “acted in such matter” as to 
preclude enforcement of the state law.113 That in turn caused the Court 
to assess Congress’s “broad and comprehensive plan” for alien 
admission, citizenship, and deportation.114 And that assessment 
incorporated the values reflected in treaty obligations and, separately, 
the protections of equality guaranteed by “[o]ur Constitution and our 
Civil Rights Act.”115 
The Hines Court understood the 1870 Civil Rights Act as 
reflecting a non-discrimination mandate that, along with other 
sources of federal law, contributed to a “comprehensive scheme” for 
the treatment of aliens that preempted inconsistent state laws. Thus, 
while declining to find that Pennsylvania’s law transgressed Section 16 
directly, the Court nonetheless relied on the Civil Rights Act when it 
identified the umbrella of federal interests that preempted state 
statutes. The Court recognized the 1870 Civil Rights Act as important 
to defining the federal structure that governed the treatment of 
immigrants and as part of the overall legislative framework adopted 
by Congress setting the terms and conditions that govern aliens in the 
United States.116 Hines thus reflects an immigrant equality principle in 
the context of preempting state laws. 
Hines also relied on the foreign affairs power as a source of the 
federal government’s immigration authority. The Court explained the 
importance of federal primacy and the implications for foreign affairs 
and international relations if states were allowed to impose 
discriminatory burdens on aliens.117 The interference with national 
interests stemming from “real or imagined wrongs” to another 
nation’s subjects could precipitate international tensions and 
reciprocal mistreatment that were matters of “national moment.”118 
The threatened mistreatment of foreign nationals was part of 
Justice Black’s broader theme that placed emphasis on the “rights, 
liberties and personal freedom of human beings.”119 He noted that the 
danger of laws “singling out aliens as particularly dangerous and 
 
 113.  Id. at 68–69. 
 114.  Id. at 69. 
 115.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. at 62–74. 
 118.  Id. at 64, 73. 
 119.  Id. at 68. 
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undesirable groups” is “deep-seated in this country.”120 He expressed 
concern throughout the opinion about the manifold ways in which 
foreign nationals could be harassed and targeted by “inquisitorial 
practices,” “police surveillance,” “injurious discrimination,” 
“indiscriminate and repeated interception,” “interrogation by public 
officials,” “irritating restrictions upon personal liberties,” and 
“indiscriminate questioning.”121 Black’s discussion of preemption 
recognized the equality rights and liberty interests of the immigrants 
themselves that underscores the immigrant equality element of 
federal law.122 
Soon after Hines, the Court decided Takahashi v. California Fish 
& Game Commission, in which Section 16 also contributed to the 
invalidation of a state law targeting Japanese immigrants.123 Takahashi 
considered a World War II-era law, first enacted by California in 1943 
during the period of Japanese-American internment, prohibiting 
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to any “alien Japanese.”124 In 
1945 the law was amended to remove the explicit reference to the 
Japanese and to bar instead any “person ineligible to citizenship.”125 
 
 120.  Id. at 70.  
 121.  Id. at 65–66, 71, 74. 
 122.  Id. at 70. Judith Resnik explains that Black’s holding is imbedded in a discussion of 
“constituting American identity by limiting the power of the government to interfere with 
‘personal liberties.’” See Judith Resnik, Bordering by Law: The Migration of Law, Crimes, 
Sovereignty, and the Mail, (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 23, 30) (on file with author) 
(tracking the Hines Court’s discussion of public registration laws as “at war with fundamental 
principles of our free government,” and characterizing the opinion as “reject[ing] adding public 
stigmatization as a facet of the government alien-relationship” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 123.  334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). 
 124.  Id. at 413. The law at issue in Takahashi was a transparent anti-Japanese statute. See 
id. at 426–27 (Murphy, J., concurring). The legislative history documented an amendment to the 
statute to make it appear less overtly race-based. Id. at 425–26 (discussing the legislative 
history).  
 125.  Id. at 425. At that time, the Japanese remained ineligible to naturalize. Id. at 412 & n.1. 
See also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 665 n.20 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (estimating 
that “[o]f the 48,158 aliens ineligible for naturalization [in the continental United States], 47,305 
were Japanese, 749 were Korean, 9 were Polynesian, and 95 belonged to other Asiatic groups” 
(citing the 1940 United States Census)). This situation arose from the 1790 Act, which restricted 
naturalization eligibility to “free white person[s].” Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 
103. A Reconstruction-era amendment extended eligibility to “persons of African descent.” Act 
of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256. For many years only “whites” and persons of 
African origin or descent were eligible for naturalization. Substantial litigation concerned which 
persons could be considered “white.” See, e.g., United States v. Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206, 
215 (1923) (holding that a “Hindu” person is not white); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 
198 (1922) (holding that a Japanese person is not white). See generally John Tehranian, Note, 
Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in 
America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (2000) (discussing litigation concerning the “whiteness” of various 
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Takahashi was denied a license in 1945 under that law.126 
The California Supreme Court upheld the restriction,127 and the 
Supreme Court granted review to consider both “federal-state 
relationships” and the Fourteenth Amendment.128 The Court appeared 
prepared to invalidate the restriction on Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.129 However, that reasoning presented potential difficulties 
because it could cast doubt on a line of cases allowing state 
restrictions against aliens based on the “special public interest” 
rationale on which California relied.130 The Court avoided dismantling 
the public interest exception by deciding (in conclusory fashion at the 
end of the opinion) that the state’s defense did not apply because 
California could not claim a sufficient “ownership” interest of fish 
within a three-mile coastal zone to justify exclusion of alien fishers 
under the Equal Protection Clause.131 Yet, the Court did not place 
 
racial groups and legal methodologies of race). In 1919 and 1924, Congress granted citizenship 
to certain American Indians. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 232, 43 Stat. 253 (granting citizenship to 
certain American Indians born in the United States); Act of Nov. 6, 1919, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350 
(granting citizenship to American Indians who served in the armed forces during World War I). 
A 1940 Act provided for naturalization of “descendants of races indigenous to the Western 
Hemisphere,” Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140, which was meant to 
extend to all American Indians, Charles Gordon, The Racial Barrier to American Citizenship, 93 
U. PA. L. REV. 237, 239 (1945). Upon repealing the Chinese exclusion laws, Congress added 
persons of Chinese origin or descent to the list of racial groups eligible to naturalize in 1943. Act 
of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600, 600. In 1946, Filipinos and “persons of races 
indigenous to India” became eligible for citizenship. Luce-Celler Act, ch. 534, 60 Stat. 416 
(1946). See generally Gerald E. Cronin, Immigration and Naturalization Laws, 7 U. DET. L.J. 
105, 120–22 (1948) (describing the progression of case law and legislation in naturalization). 
Racial restrictions on naturalization were finally eliminated in 1952. See generally Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163; CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 94.01(2). 
 126.  Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 414.  
 127.  Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 30 Cal. 2d 719 (1947), rev’d, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
The state court ruled that “in furtherance of its declared public policy to prohibit ineligible 
aliens from taking its animals ferae naturae,” California could permissibly refuse to issue fishing 
licenses to ineligible aliens. Id. at 736–37. 
 128.  Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 415.  
 129.  Id. at 415–16.  
 130.  Id. at 417. Takahashi also cited Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), for the “special 
public interest” doctrine, which in turn cited Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145–46 
(1914). See Patsone, 232 U.S. at 145–46 (upholding a statute prohibiting aliens from owning guns 
for purposes other than defense of self or property because states have the right to prohibit 
noncitizens from hunting their wild game); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340–41 (1901) 
(holding that states may restrict aliens’ inheritance rights in the absence of a treaty); Hauenstein 
v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1879) (holding that states may make laws restricting the rights of 
aliens to hold real property); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 397 (1876) (holding that a state 
can reserve the right to plant oysters in its riverbanks to citizens of the state). 
 131.  Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 421 (finding that “‘ownership’ is inadequate to justify California 
in excluding any or all aliens” lawfully in the state from fishing in coastal waters). 
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exclusive reliance on a robust view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
proscriptions. Rather, the Court began with a lengthy discussion of 
federal law and federal interests. It focused on the federal 
government’s broad constitutional powers over the admission and 
regulation of aliens132 as well as the protections of the 1870 Act.133 
Takahashi underscored that states can neither “add to nor take 
from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress on admission, 
naturalization and residence.”134 The Court explained that 
“discriminatory burdens” on entrance or residence of aliens lawfully 
within the United States “conflict with th[e] constitutionally derived 
federal power to regulate immigration” and are invalid.135 
However, and importantly, Takahashi did not rest exclusively on 
the federal power to regulate admission and expulsion of aliens. 
Takahashi—in an opinion again authored by Justice Black—also 
emphasized the affirmative prohibition against discrimination 
embodied in Section 16 of the 1870 Civil Rights Act.136 The Court 
conceptualized this anti-discrimination protection as centrally within 
Congress’s enactment of a “comprehensive legislative plan for the 
nation-wide control and regulation of immigration and 
naturalization.”137 Like Yick Wo, Takahashi quotes the text of Section 
16 in its entirety and affirms its protection for aliens.138 The Court thus 
recognized that the congressional scheme encompassed both the 
 
 132.  Id. at 419 (“The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining 
what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of 
their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.” (citing 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941))).  
 133.  Id. at 419–20. 
 134.  Id. In Takahashi, as well as in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)—a case Takahashi 
cites prominently—the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis is infused with concern over 
state interference with federal authority in the event a state discriminated against an alien 
lawfully admitted to the United States. The Court referred to the protection afforded persons 
“lawfully” in the country and denied states power to single out and ban their “lawful” alien 
inhabitants. Takahashi, 344 U.S. at 419–20. As I discuss in Part III, infra, these references did 
not denude the 1870 Act of its power to preempt state laws that target aliens indiscriminately or 
that single out those who are unlawfully in the United States. See infra Part III and text 
accompanying notes 180–93. 
 135.  Takahashi, 344 U.S. at 419.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 419 (“Congress, in the enactment of a comprehensive legislative plan for the 
nation-wide control and regulation of immigration and naturalization, has broadly provided 
[quoting Section 16 in its entirety].” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 41 (1948))). 
 138.  Id. 419 (“The protection of this section has been held to extend to aliens as well as to 
citizens.” (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 696 (1898); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Fraser v. McConway & Torley Co., 82 F. 257 (C.C.D. Penn. 1897); In 
re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481, 508–09 (C.C.D. Cal.  1880))).  
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immigration control and the immigrant equality strands of 
preemption in the “legislative plan” governing immigration and 
immigrants. 
Takahashi is significant because it further demonstrates that the 
Civil Rights Act supports displacing state law to enforce equality even 
if the state discrimination does not obviously contradict the equal 
protection safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Takahashi, 
the California law teetered on the edge of Equal Protection 
vulnerability and the Court invoked Section 16 to buttress its 
analysis.139 The Court emphasized that the California statute was 
contrary to federal law, including the Civil Rights Act of 1870.140 
Second, and notable for the contemporary debate, California tried 
to defend its law by arguing that it should be permitted to single out 
Japanese non-citizens because they were subject to discrimination and 
disabilities under federal law. The State urged that it was “simply 
follow[ing] the Federal Government’s lead”141 and “adopting [the] 
classification from the naturalization laws.”142 The Takahashi Court 
 
 139.  Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 417–18. As Justice Brennan explained for the Court in Toll v. 
Moreno: “While pre-emption played a significant role in the Court’s analysis in Takahashi, the 
actual basis for invalidation of the California statute was apparently the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution.” 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982). Brennan emphasized, however, that 
“many of the Court’s decisions concerning alienage classifications, such as Takahashi, are better 
explained in pre-emption than in equal protection terms.” Id. (citing Michael J. Perry, Modern 
Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–65 (1979); 
David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. 
L. REV. 1069 (1979)).  
 140.  In some cases, where under existing doctrine the Equal Protection Clause does not 
clearly bar a state statute because strict scrutiny may not apply, the equality element of 
preemption plays a paramount role. Hiroshi Motomura more ambitiously suggests that Equal 
Protection itself should limit state immigration enforcement laws targeting undocumented 
immigrants on the ground that such statutes may lead to discrimination. See generally 
Motomura, supra note 9, at 2063–65; Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims 
and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1742–44 (2010). The preemption 
framework I advance here should strengthen Motomura’s claim by providing historical and 
normative support for an anti-discrimination principle derived from federal law and applicable 
broadly to protect all non-citizens.    
 141.  Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 418.  
 142.  Id. California’s claim thus echoed contemporary “mirror image” arguments asserting 
that states should be permitted to penalize aliens disfavored under federal law by “mirroring” 
the federal classification. See Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and 
Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 465, 475–77 (2008) 
(arguing that the “mirror image” is an area where states can act constitutionally in the field of 
immigration). As I explain elsewhere, that theory lost any claim to legitimacy after Arizona v. 
United States. Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 35–42. Takahashi’s 
rejection of California’s arguments was underscored in Toll v. Moreno when Justice Rehnquist 
in dissent unsuccessfully sought to recast the Takahashi decision to permit state laws disfavoring 
some non-citizens so long as the law in question was consistent with federal immigration 
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rejected that justification as inconsistent with both the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the laws “adopted under its authority.”143 The Court 
stressed again that Section 16 “extends to aliens as well as to 
citizens,”144 and, importantly, that the law protects “‘all persons’ 
against state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because 
of alienage or color.”145 
Finally, in Graham v. Richardson the Court discussed the equality-
based preemption principle more expansively. Graham concerned 
state welfare statutes from Arizona and Pennsylvania imposing 
discriminatory restrictions on immigrant eligibility for state benefits 
programs.146 The Court held that the restrictions violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.147 The Fourteenth Amendment ruling marked a sea 
change in equal protection doctrine,148 establishing alienage as a 
suspect classification and subjecting state immigration classifications 
 
criteria. See 458 U.S. at 27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court rejected that assertion. Id. at 
11 (“We rejected the argument [in Takahashi that the state had ‘simply followed the Federal 
Government’s lead’] stressing the delicate nature of the federal-state relationship in regulating 
aliens . . . .”).  
 143.  Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420. See also id. at 419 (“It does not follow . . . that because the 
United States regulates immigration and naturalization in part on the basis of race and color 
classifications, a state can adopt one or more of the same classifications . . . .”); id. at 420 (“[T]he 
power of the state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined 
within narrow limits.”).  
 144.  Id. at 419.  
 145.  Id.  at 420 (emphasis added) (citing Hurd v. Hodge, 344 U.S. 24, 33 (1948)). 
 146.  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366–68 (1971). 
 147.  Id. at 376. Eight Justices joined the Court’s opinion holding that state “alienage” 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 371–72. The Arizona statute limited eligibility 
for state disability assistance programs (funded in part by federal grants) to United States 
citizens and to legal resident aliens who had resided in the country for at least fifteen years. Id. 
at 366–67. The Pennsylvania statute limited eligibility for state welfare benefits (funded entirely 
by the state) to United States citizens, excluding all aliens. Id. at 368. 
 148.  Id. at 371–72. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and 
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1135, 1164 (1996) 
(characterizing Graham as the “modern approach” to equal protection analysis); Levi, supra 
note 139, 1069–70 (noting the significance of Graham for equal protection jurisprudence). See 
generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
161–62 (1980) (calling the application of heightened scrutiny to alienage classifications a 
“relatively easy case”). See also id. at 148–49, 151 (tracing the level of scrutiny applied to 
alienage classifications). The understanding that state or local laws denying equal rights to 
immigrants may violate the Equal Protection Clause under some circumstances predated 
Graham. Most notably, after Yick Wo, in Truax v. Raich the Court held that an Arizona law 
limiting private employment of aliens violated their equal protection rights. 239 U.S. 33, 43 
(1915). But that Equal Protection principle was limited by earlier decisions affirming a “special 
public interest” exception, which permitted alienage discrimination by public entities in the 
distribution of public goods or contracts. See, e.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 193–94 (1915) 
(applying the exception to a statute prohibiting noncitizens from employment on public works). 
See supra note 106. 
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to strict scrutiny.149 This imposed new and insurmountable hurdles for 
most state restrictions based on alienage.150 
The equal protection ruling, however, overshadowed Graham’s 
second—and independent—holding that the state welfare restrictions 
were also preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause.151 
That portion of the decision is easily overlooked and generally 
underappreciated. The Court held that—independent of Equal 
Protection—an “additional reason” for invalidating the state laws was 
based on the “constitutional scrutiny emerg[ing] from . . . federal-state 
relations.”152 The Court determined that the state welfare laws were 
invalid as in “conflict with . . . overriding national policies” for several 
reasons.153 Importantly, those reasons were not limited to the 
immigration law or federal enforcement power rationale for 
preemption (i.e., immigration control). They also included the 
immigrant protections enacted by Section 16 reflecting the immigrant 
equality component of federal law.154 
To be sure, the Court began by noting the “comprehensive plan 
for the regulation of immigration and naturalization.”155 Thus, it 
stressed the federal government’s “broad constitutional powers” over 
 
 149.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72.  
 150.  After Graham, the Court developed the “political function” exception to acknowledge 
areas of political self-definition where states could permissibly exclude non-citizens. See Foley v. 
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1978) (holding the exception applicable to a statute barring 
aliens from becoming state troopers); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–43 (1973) 
(establishing the “political function”  exception). 
 151.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 376–77 (“An additional reason why the state statutes do not 
withstand constitutional scrutiny emerges from the area of federal-state relations.”). Justice 
Harlan joined only the preemption holding. Id. at 383 (Harlan, J., joining in part and in 
judgment). Considerable scholarship addresses the role of equal protection versus preemption 
rationales in immigration federalism cases. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, From Graham to 
Bernal: Justice Blackmun’s Equal Protection Theory of Aliens’ Rights, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 52, 
58–60 (1985) (discussing Graham’s dual equal protection and preemption holdings); Perry, 
supra note 139, 1060–64 (arguing that the Court’s immigration federalism jurisprudence is better 
explained as preemption than equal protection); Levi, supra note 139, at 1070 (arguing that 
Graham and other immigration federalism cases “follow[] an unarticulated theory of 
preemption”).  
 152.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 376–77.  
 153.  Id. at 378 (“State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely 
because of their alienage conflict with these overriding policies in an area constitutionally 
entrusted to the Federal Government.”).  
 154.  Id. at 377. 
 155.  Id. The Court stated that immigration regulation was “constitutionally entrusted” to 
the federal government. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate 
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”). But see Arizona v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–15 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that states possess some 
authority to regulate immigration).  
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aliens’ admission, duration of stay, conditions on residency, and 
naturalization.156 The opinion elaborated on Congress’s 
“comprehensive plan” enumerating the grounds of exclusion (i.e., 
denial of entry at the border) and deportation (i.e., expulsion after 
entering or being admitted) that concern indigency, poverty, or the 
likelihood of becoming a “public charge.”157 Reasoning by inference, 
the Court stressed that “Congress has not seen fit to impose any 
burden or restriction on aliens who become indigent after their entry 
into the United States.”158 Thus, the state prohibitions were not 
enforcing federal immigration restrictions. 
However, after laying out those rationales derived from the 
immigration regulation and control dimension of federal law, Graham 
pivoted to the anti-discrimination mandate of Section 16.159 After 
quoting it at length,160 the Court emphasized that “[t]he protection of 
this statute” had long been held “to extend to aliens as well as to 
citizens,”161 and declared that state laws are limited by broadly-
conceived “overriding national policies” that regulate immigrants and 
protect them against discrimination.162 
Graham reinforces the understanding that the Civil Rights Act 
embodies a transcendent federal principle prohibiting discrimination 
based on alienage. In earlier cases, like Yick Wo and Takahashi, issues 
of alienage discrimination had been conjoined with hostility based on 
race and ethnicity.163 Hence the pure alienage non-discrimination 
mandate of Section 16 may not have been operating alone. In Graham 
 
 156.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 377 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 
419 (1948)). Among the cases the Court cites are the canonical sources of the federal “plenary 
power.” See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The Court also cites two essential preemption cases: Takahashi and 
Hines. 
 157.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 377.  
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. By then the provision was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  
 160.  Id. (“[Congress] has broadly declared: ‘All persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981)).  
 161.  Id. (citing Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419); see also id. at 378 (“[A]liens lawfully within this 
country have a right to enter and abide in any State in the Union ‘on an equality of legal 
privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws.’” (quoting Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 
420)). 
 162.  Id. at 378 (“State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely 
because of their alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an area 
constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”). 
 163.  Yick Wo targeted Chinese immigrants and Takahashi singled out Japanese. See supra 
text accompanying notes 97 and 124.   
GUTTENTAG 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  9:10 PM 
38 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 8:1 
there was no discernible racial component, and the Court rejected the 
Pennsylvania and Arizona laws without any reference to race or 
nationality. Graham invoked the Civil Rights Act equality principle to 
show inconsistency with the “comprehensive [federal] plan” where 
the state discrimination was purely on the basis of alienage without 
any need to find immigration status serving as a proxy for ethnic or 
race-based animosity. 
Critically, the Court in Graham recognized that Section 16’s non-
discrimination mandate is an important element of the federal 
framework that defines “the overriding national policies” limiting 
state autonomy.164 The Court employed an encompassing view of the 
federal laws and purposes that constitute the federal structure 
governing—and protecting—immigrants. The decision rested not just 
on the laws relating to admission and expulsion but also on the civil 
rights command of equality for non-citizens. The Court’s analysis 
stands unmistakably for the principle that the preemptive force of 
federal law derives not just from immigration-control statutes that 
regulate the admission, expulsion, and residence of non-citizens; 
preemption also enforces the prohibitions against discrimination 
originating in the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Graham’s preemption 
analysis effectuated both the immigration control and the immigrant 
equality ground. The two in tandem comprise the federal policies 
against which state restrictions must be measured. 
*  *  * 
After Graham, the Court’s resolution of challenges to state 
alienage classifications has turned almost exclusively on whether the 
restrictions violate the Equal Protection Clause.165 The Supreme Court 
decided only two immigration cases on federal preemption grounds 
between 1971 and 2011.166 One, DeCanas v. Bica,167 held that a state 
 
 164.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 378. 
 165.  The Court decided numerous cases that applied strict scrutiny and that articulated the 
“political function” exception to heightened scrutiny of state classifications. See supra note 150. 
See also Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 4 n.12 (collecting post-Graham 
cases addressing state alienage restrictions).  
 166.  Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 4, 17 (1982) (holding a university policy denying certain 
aliens in-state status preempted by federal immigration laws); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 
352, 356 (1976) (upholding a California statute penalizing employers for knowingly hiring illegal 
aliens as an exercise of traditional state power); see also Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 
265, 282–83 (1977) (holding a Virginia statute restricting fishing licenses based on citizenship 
preempted by the Enrollment and Licensing Act and the federal scheme of fishing licensing and 
regulation).  
 167.  424 U.S. 351 (1976).  
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alien employment regulation was within the state’s historic police 
powers and, moreover, implicitly authorized by federal law, thus 
rejecting the federal preemption claim.168 The other, Toll v. Moreno,169 
found that the state policy denying equal access to in-state tuition to 
certain “non-immigrant” foreign nationals temporarily residing in the 
country was inconsistent with their treatment under federal 
immigration (and other) laws, though the Court did not expressly rely 
on or invoke the Civil Rights Act.170 
The Court did not hear another immigration preemption case 
until Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.171 By then Section 16 and the 
equality principle it embodied had not been cited by the Court in an 
immigration case for nearly forty years.172 Today, equality-based 
 
 168.  In DeCanas, a state law penalized agricultural employers who hired immigrant workers 
not lawfully eligible to work under federal law. Id. at 359–61. The Court upheld the employer 
sanctions law as not categorically prohibited on field preemption grounds and as falling within 
the traditional powers of the state in a realm in which the federal government exhibited only 
peripheral concern with immigrant employment. Id. at 365. The case was remanded for 
consideration of conflict preemption. Id. at 360. No reference to the 1870 Act appears in that 
decision. The role that this protection should play in the DeCanas setting, had the Court 
considered it, is complex. In Toll v. Moreno, the Court explained that federal law affirmatively 
authorized the California statute upheld in DeCanas. 458 U.S. 1, 47 n.18 (1982). On that 
reading, the state law would presumably not be preempted. Had the Court engaged in a broad 
canvassing of the applicable federal law, it should have considered the effect of the non-
discrimination rule reflected in Section 16 and whether the California statute posed a threat of 
discrimination either in the Court’s field preemption ruling or as encompassed within the 
remand for conflict preemption.  
 169.  458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
 170.  The Court invalidated a state tuition policy denying in-state tuition rates to certain 
non-immigrant visa holders as conflicting with federal law. Id. at 4, 17. The Court quoted 
Takahashi at length, id. at 11, read it as an equal protection case with significant preemption 
elements, id. at 12, and referred elliptically to its passages implicating Section 16 without 
directly citing them, id. at 12–13. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist sparred over the proper 
reading of Takahashi, with the majority rejecting Rehnquist’s view. See supra note 142. 
 171.  131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). See Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 4–7 
(discussing and enumerating alienage discrimination cases after Takahashi until Arizona).  
 172.  During that period, lower courts disagreed over the reach of § 1981’s application to 
private conduct, including private alienage discrimination. After the Supreme Court held that § 
1981 applied to private race discrimination, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 169–70 (1976) 
(holding that § 1981 prohibits private race discrimination), the lower courts took up the issue of 
whether private alienage discrimination was also prohibited, see Bhandari v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343, 1351–42 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that § 1981 does not reach private 
alienage discrimination committed under color of state law); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal 
Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 653–54 (5th Cir.1974) (holding that § 1981 reaches private alienage 
discrimination). See also Duane v. GEICO, 37 F.3d 1036, 1043 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that § 
1981 prohibited private alienage discrimination). The issue was rendered moot by a 1991 
amendment to § 1981 that added explicit language covering private conduct. See Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (“The rights protected by this 
section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment 
under color of State law.”); Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
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concerns appear reserved for Equal Protection claims, and 
preemption has become defined by immigration enforcement and 
regulation considerations. As the Court begins to grapple with 
contemporary sub-federal laws and to elaborate the scope and 
purposes of the federal framework regulating and protecting foreign 
nationals in the United States, the immigrant equality protection 
spawned by the Civil Rights Act of 1870 has a vital role to play. 
 
III. PREEMPTION AND EQUALITY 
The preceding account seeks to show that protecting non-citizens 
against sub-federal discrimination was a central and deliberate 
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, that the Act constitutes an 
essential component of federal policy, and that the Supreme Court 
has recognized—and enforced—the Act’s immigrant equality 
safeguard in its Supremacy Clause analysis to preempt inconsistent 
state laws. 
In the contemporary context, revitalizing the equality element of 
preemption has important consequences. First, it would oblige courts 
to assess whether local immigration measures are inconsistent with 
federal civil rights principles. That means preemption would look at 
more than the express or implicit limits on local enforcement that 
might be present in federal immigration control law; preemption 
would properly be concerned as well with the discriminatory 
consequences of state and local measures. 
Second, the immigrant equality component of federal law 
illuminates a fundamental distinction between two types of 
contemporary local laws based on whether they advance or retard the 
equality of non-citizens. Local measures that further equality and 
reduce discrimination—i.e., immigrant-friendly (or so-called 
“sanctuary”) laws—find affirmative support in the federal framework. 
In contrast, local laws that diminish equality or engender 
discrimination are at odds with federal equality goals. Immigrant 
equality is a federal objective rooted in congressional enactments that 
differentiates among categories of local immigration laws and 
 
§ 1981 prohibited private alienage discrimination, “at least” since the 1991 Act). The 1991 
amendment also resolved other disagreements about the scope of § 1981’s substantive 
protections. See generally CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008) 
(explaining that the 1991 Act superseded the holding of Patterson v. McLean, 491 U.S. 164 
(1989) and other cases in which the Court found that § 1981 did not cover post-hiring 
discrimination). See supra note 94. 
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ordinances. 
A. Enforcing Non-Discrimination 
The value the federal statutory scheme places on  
non-discrimination means that courts considering preemption should 
scrutinize whether state immigration laws cause discrimination 
against immigrants in addition to whether they constitute 
impermissible enforcement mechanisms. The immigration control 
approach adopted in Arizona asks whether a state law or practice 
exceeds the enforcement authority delegated to the state and whether 
it pierces a functional ceiling on the enforcement methods authorized 
by federal law. The immigrant equality component would also inquire 
into the danger of immigration discrimination that a state law poses. 
For example, in Arizona, the Court’s assessment of Section 2B’s 
“show me your papers” law focused on whether the state detention 
and verification scheme might exceed federal enforcement 
authorization. Because the Court found that federal law required the 
Law Enforcement Support Center to respond to state inquiries about 
immigration status, the Court found no clear inconsistency between 
Section 2B’s mandated inquiry and the federal enforcement scheme.173 
The Court thus rejected a facial preemption claim.174 Though alluding 
to discrimination concerns, the Court did not evaluate Section 2B 
against an affirmative federal non-discrimination requirement. If 
immigrant equality were acknowledged as a core value of federal law, 
evidence that Section 2B increases the danger of profiling or 
discrimination would properly be part of the preemption analysis 
rather than be marginalized as an entirely distinct claim.175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 173.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508 (2012). 
 174.  Id. As I have noted elsewhere, the Court imposed significant limits on Section 2B. 
Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 13–15. 
 175.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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 Similarly, contemporary measures that single out or stigmatize 
non-citizens seeking access to the civil or criminal justice system,176 
restrict eligibility for housing based on immigration status,177 or 
impede immigrants’ attendance at public schools178 would be 
vulnerable to preemption under the immigrant equality prong. 
Although such enforcement measures may also be invalid under the 
Arizona immigration control paradigm, that framework is not the 
only basis for determining congressional objectives and the scope of 
preemption. Some state laws that oblige local officials to transmit 
certain immigration information to federal agencies may be thought 
to fit within the permissible immigration control ceiling. They may 
appear congruent with federal information-sharing policies and may 
not implicate the prolonged or uninvited police detention that 
Arizona disapproved. But such laws may nonetheless single out 
immigrants for separate treatment, impose discriminatory burdens, or 
encourage disparate effects. State immigration enforcement laws that 
generate ethnic stereotyping or incentivize racial profiling would be 
inconsistent with federal non-discrimination values.179 Preemption 
should take into account the law’s interference with the federal 
purpose of immigrant equality. 
 
 
 
 
 176.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-32 (2012) (requiring the name of an “unlawfully present 
alien” who is detained by law enforcement and appears in state court to be posted). The 
provision is the subject of litigation. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Doe 
v. Hobson, No. 2:13-cv-00079-WKW-CSC (M.D. Ala. Feb 7, 2013). 
 177.  Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2013 WL 3855549, *1 (3d Cir. July 
26, 2013) (holding a city ordinance that attempted to regulate “the provision of rental housing to 
aliens lacking lawful immigration status” within the city preempted by federal law), and Villas at 
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL 3791664, *1–2 (5th Cir. 
July 22, 2013) (holding a city ordinance that sought to bar non-citizens “not lawfully present in 
the United States” from renting housing in the city preempted by federal law), with Keller v. 
City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 937–38 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding a city ordinance that made it 
unlawful to rent, or permit occupancy by, an “alien not lawfully present in the United States” 
within the city not preempted by federal law). 
 178.  See Hispanic Interest Coal. v. Governor of Ala. (HICA), 691 F.3d 1236, 1244–50 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (remanding for injunction against ALA. CODE § 31-13-27, which required Alabama 
education officials to collect data about the alienage of public K-12 students and their parents). 
See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (holding that discrimination against 
undocumented children in K-12 public school is subject to heightened scrutiny). 
 179.  This Article does not attempt an exhaustive survey of current or potential state and 
local measures. My goal is to broaden the framework for preemption analysis of sub-federal 
laws. Whether any particular state or local law or policy is actually preempted necessarily turns 
on a careful reading of the specific state measure and federal provisions at issue. 
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The fact that laws like SB 1070 purport to target only 
undocumented immigrants does not negate the non-discrimination 
command of the Civil Rights Act as an essential element of 
preemption. To be sure, the Court’s earlier cases invoking Section 16 
as part of the federal framework often focused on the “lawful” status 
of the immigrants affected by sub-federal laws.180 But equality retains 
its force as a goal of federal law—even if states claim to single out 
only those who are not lawful or documented. 
That is the case because, among other reasons, laws that purport to 
focus on unauthorized aliens typically encourage scrutiny based on 
suspicion of undocumented status. This inevitably ensnares many 
lawful residents and citizens who share the assumed or stereotypical 
traits of suspected undocumented immigrants.181 More fundamentally, 
Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 are broad in their 
coverage and neither distinguishes between lawfully and unlawfully 
present immigrants. Section 16 applies to “all persons” and ensures 
their equality with “citizens” in “every State and Territory.”182 Section 
17 outlaws subjecting individuals to differential treatment or 
punishment on account of “being an alien.”183 There is no textual 
limitation or suggestion that only some aliens are protected and that 
others may be subjected to differential state sanctions or 
punishments.184 When Yick Wo first confronted the 1870 Act (along 
with the text and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment), the Court 
 
 180.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 181.  Considering the impact on lawful immigrants for preemption purposes is distinct from 
whether § 1981 would itself be directly violated by an ordinance that lacks the requisite 
discriminatory purpose. The Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires a showing of 
purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) 
(noting that § 1981 requires a showing of “purposeful discrimination”). Even if one assumed 
that only lawful aliens were protected by § 1981, which is contrary to the text, that would not 
answer the broader question of whether a local ordinance aimed only at undocumented 
immigrants that demonstrably precipitates or raises the danger of alienage discrimination—even 
if not purposeful—against lawful residents (through ethnic profiling or by other means) 
nonetheless interferes with federal policy or constitutes an obstacle to a federal goal.  
 182.  Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144. 
 183.  Id. § 17. 
 184.  The lower courts have applied Section 17’s protections generally to undocumented 
aliens. See United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 243–44 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 although the victim was an “illegal alien”). The term 
“inhabitant” may not have had as broad a scope (before it was amended to “persons”), but that 
term did not turn on an alien's immigration status under federal law. See United States v. 
Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 227–28 (1st Cir. 1990) (overturning a conviction where the alleged 
victim was a temporary visitor, though acknowledging that “[w]e can understand how one might 
bring an ‘illegal alien,’ intending to stay in the country for some time, within the scope of the 
word ‘inhabitant’”). See also supra note 66.  
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emphasized that the protection applied to all—including “aliens and 
subjects of the Emperor of China”185—and that it mandated an 
equality of rights between citizens and those of “strangers and 
aliens.”186 
Some might argue that the 1870 Act (and the language of Yick 
Wo) should not apply fully when states target undocumented 
immigrants because the Act predates the major federal immigration 
regulation adopted in 1875 and thereafter. Hence, the argument 
contends, Congress could not have intended to protect aliens who 
were in the country in violation of federal law. This fails to grapple 
with the broader effect on immigrant equality of laws even when they 
formalistically target only some non-citizens. The argument also fails 
to recognize the existence of some federal immigration regulation at 
the time of the 1870 Act (and extensive regulation by the time of Yick 
Wo). Federal legislation prohibited entry of some foreigners as early 
as 1862—before passage of the 1870 Civil Rights Act.187 The Act’s 
reference to “all persons” would, by its plain language, apply to 
persons present in the United States in violation of any earlier 
restrictions.188 
 
 185.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).  
 186.  Id. at 369.  
 187.  For example, as commentators have noted, 1862 legislation prohibited the importation 
of “Coolies” from China and 1869 legislation extended the restriction to Japan and other Asian 
countries. See supra note 78. Many commentators understand the 1862 Act as a regulation of 
immigration. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative 
State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002) (“[The Act] was intended to prevent the 
importation of ‘Coolies’ . . . .”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 114 (2002) (“Anti-Chinese sentiment also was prevalent at the national level. In 
1862, Congress prohibited involuntary Asian immigration, and the 1875 Page Act again barred 
involuntary ‘Oriental’ laborers, as well as convicts and prostitutes.”); Renee C. Redman, From 
Importation of Slaves to Migration of Laborers: The Struggle to Outlaw American Participation 
in the Chinese Coolie Trade and the Seeds of United States Immigration Law, 3 ALB. GOV'T L. 
REV. 1, 49 (2010) (“[The [1875] Law was not the first federal law to regulate immigration. It 
amended the Coolie Trade Prohibition Act, of February 19, 1862 . . . .”). See also Arizona v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 2492, 2513 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Kerry Abrams, 
Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 
668–69 (2005) (arguing that the 1862 Act was intended to prohibit American involvement in the 
slave trade, not to restrict immigration). Further, as Gerald Neuman has shown, states too had 
enacted laws regulating the entry of persons into states and their right to remain once present. 
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 
1901 (1993). He explains that persons considered illegally present under state law would appear 
to have been understood to be “an illegal immigrant to the United States.” Id. 
 188.  Of course, by the time of Yick Wo in 1886 Congress had enacted the major 
immigration regulation and restriction laws of 1875 and 1882. See generally E.P. HUTCHINSON, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965 46 (1981) (“The 
complaints about the coming of foreign paupers, criminals, and other undesirables, long familiar 
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It also bears recalling that Chinese immigrants of the mid-
nineteenth century were the most disfavored and stigmatized 
category of non-citizens under federal law. The Chinese were subject 
to pernicious and discriminatory exclusion and deportation laws,189 
were barred from the polity and ineligible for naturalization,190 were 
threatened with perpetual non-citizenship until the Supreme Court 
intervened in United States v. Wong Kim Ark,191 and were treated as 
disreputable and untrustworthy under federal law.192 Yet, Congress 
granted them a measure of civil rights equality and protection by 
consciously sweeping them into the scope of an historic and enduring 
Civil Rights Acts that denied states the authority to “follow the lead” 
of federal law.193 Federal disfavor or disability does not authorize state 
discrimination. 
B. Advancing Equality 
Recognizing the immigrant equality element of federal law also 
suggests an important conceptual difference between local measures 
that seek to further immigrant equality and those that seek to enforce 
immigration status violations. 
Laws that support immigrant equality or integration should be 
understood as affirmatively furthering the anti-discrimination, 
immigrant-equality purposes of federal law. These local measures may, 
for example, instruct local police departments not to gather 
immigration information or not to enforce immigration status 
violations;194 they may provide equal eligibility for in-state tuition at 
 
to the colonial and state governments, were repeatedly heard in Congress.”). My point is not 
that the 1870 Civil Rights Act necessarily outlaws all classifications against any category of non-
citizens. Rather, it is that the non-discrimination requirement of the Civil Rights Act cannot be 
discarded as a factor in preemption analysis simply because a state law claims to target only 
immigrants present without federal permission. 
 189.  See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724–28 (1893); Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889).  
 190.  See supra note 125.  
 191.  169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).  
 192.  Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727 (requiring a non-Chinese, white witness to prove 
eligibility for a  residence certificate).  
 193.  See supra note 142 and accompanying text.  
 194.  See, e.g., HARTFORD, CONN., MUNI. CODE ch. 2, art. 21 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 
181.850(1) (2011) (stating that law enforcement agencies and political subdivisions shall not 
“use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting or apprehending 
persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign citizenship present in the 
United States in violation of federal immigration laws”); Milwaukee, Wis., General Order 2008-
03 (eff. Aug. 26, 2008); Virginia Beach, Va., Operational General Order 11.10 (eff. May 1, 
2007); New Haven, Conn., General Order 06-2 (eff. Dec. 21, 2006); Seattle, Wash., Directive 03-
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public colleges for all state residents;195 authorize drivers licenses to 
every qualifying driver;196 allow law school graduates who pass the bar 
to be licensed as attorneys regardless of immigration status;197 or 
establish universal municipal identity documents available to every 
city resident.198 
 
57 (eff. 2002). By and large, these orders allow local police to inquire into immigration status 
only after an individual has been arrested for a serious crime or in the course of a criminal 
investigation. 
 195.  See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 68130.5 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10a-29(9) (West 2013). Fourteen states have clear policies allowing undocumented immigrants 
to pay in-state tuition at state institutions of higher education. Twelve states have statutes 
allowing anyone graduating from a state high school to claim in-state tuition: Texas, California, 
Utah, New York, Washington, Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Maryland, 
and Connecticut. Rhode Island has a policy allowing undocumented immigrants to claim in-
state tuition enacted by its Board of Governors for Higher Education. Maryland passed a law 
allowing for in-state tuition for undocumented students as long as they meet certain 
requirements. In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/in-state-
tuition-and-unauthorized-immigrants.aspx (last updated Nov. 28, 2012). In addition, Oklahoma 
previously had a law allowing for in-state tuition. That law was repealed in 2008, but the 
Oklahoma State Regents still has the power to enroll a student if he or she meets certain 
criteria. Map of States with In-State Tuition Laws, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa 
.com/content/learn/dream-act/map-states-state-tuition-laws.html (“[T]he new law allows the 
state’s Board of Regents to award in-state tuition to illegal aliens who have attended an 
Oklahoma high school for at least two years and graduated. They must also sign an affidavit 
[stating] that they are trying to legalize their status or will do so . . . .”).  
 196.  See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-9(B) (West 2013); N.M. CODE. R. § 18.19.5.12(D) 
(LexisNexis 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.035(3) (West 2013). In addition, thirty-eight 
states issue drivers licenses to individuals receiving deferred action relief under the Obama 
administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. See Are 
Individuals Granted Deferred Action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
Policy Eligible for State Driver’s Licenses?, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, 
http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated Apr. 9, 2013). 
 197.  The California bar, with the Attorney General’s support, is seeking to allow such 
licensing, and the issue is currently before both the California and Florida Supreme Courts. See 
Steve Bousquet, Florida Supreme Court Considers: Can Immigrant Illegally in U.S. Practice 
Law?, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/02/3031618/florida-
supreme-court-considers.html; Maura Dolan, California State Bar Argues for Law Licenses for 
the Undocumented, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/19/local/la-
me-immigrant-lawyer-20120619. The docket for In re Sergio C. Garcia on Admission is available 
at http://www.courts.ca.gov/18822.htm. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Kamala Harris, 
Attorney General of the State of California, In re Garcia, No. S202512 (Cal. July 18, 2012), 
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4-s202512-amicus-ca-atty-general-kamala-
harris-071812.pdf. 
 198.  At least eight municipalities have some form of municipal ID: Los Angeles, CA; New 
Haven, CT; Oakland, CA; San Francisco, CA; Trenton, NJ; Princeton, NJ; Asbury Park, NY; 
Washington, D.C.; and Mercer Co., NJ. Eligibility for drivers’ licenses is in flux. Dan Frosch, A 
New Fight on Licenses for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/us/in-new-mexico-a-fight-anew-over-drivers-licenses-for-
illegal-immigrants.html; Mary Wisniewski, Illinois May Give Driver’s Licenses to Illegal 
Immigrants, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/21/15333584-
illinois-may-give-drivers-licenses-to-illegal-immigrants?lite. 
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These equality-enhancing measures typically function by declining 
to inquire into an individual’s immigration status. They are designed 
to put all residents on an equal footing for municipal matters by 
making immigration distinctions irrelevant for local purposes. The 
local laws may be adopted to minimize the risk of racial or ethnic 
profiling by police or other civil servants,199 to ensure confidence in 
community policing,200 to remove crippling and demoralizing hurdles 
that impede young immigrant high-school graduates from accessing 
educational opportunities,201 or to facilitate access to libraries, banking 
services, and other institutions. Localities may choose such policies to 
further local interests and public safety.202 
 
 
 
 
 
 199.  Race, ethnicity, and nationality are typical factors for determining suspicion of alien 
status. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975); United States v. 
Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). For a particularly telling example of 
local law enforcement using these factors impermissibly, see Letter from Thomas E. Perez, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att’y of Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. (Dec. 15, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf.  
 200.  See e.g., D.C. Mayor's Order No. 2011-174, 58 D.C. Reg. 009083 (Oct. 19, 2011).  
In addition to promoting important community policing goals, assistance from 
immigrant populations is especially important when an immigrant, whether 
documented or not, is the victim of or witness to a crime. These persons must feel 
comfortable in coming forward with information and in filing reports. Their 
cooperation is needed to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety, 
and security in the entire community. One of our most important goals is to enhance 
our relationship with immigrant communities as well as to establish new and ongoing 
partnerships consistent with our community policing philosophy.  
Id. 
 201.  For example, on signing the Maryland DREAM Act, Governor Martin O’Malley said: 
“The more that we do to make the dream of a college education a real opportunity for every 
child in Maryland, the stronger that makes Maryland.” Alina Mogilyanskaya, In Md. Voters’ 
Approval of Dream Act, Hope for Students and Sign for the Nation, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Nov. 6, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Hope-for-StudentsSign-for/135596/. 
 202.  See, e.g., Statement of Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Police, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 20, 
2007), available at http://newsroom.dc.gov/show.aspx/agency/mpdc/section/4/release/10998/ 
year/2007. 
Our department is responsible for providing police services to everyone in the District 
of Columbia—equally, fairly, and justly. To help carry out that mission, we have 
adopted a strategy of community policing—of police and residents working together 
to fight crime in a partnership of cooperation, respect, and trust. If some of our 
residents are reluctant to interact with police, because they fear we are there to 
enforce civil immigration laws, then all hopes for partnership and cooperation are lost, 
and what really suffers the most is the safety of entire communities.  
Id. 
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Such laws—often referred to somewhat misleadingly as 
“sanctuary” laws203—are designed to reduce the salience of 
immigration status for local matters. The measures provide that 
immigration categories and violations should matter only for required 
federal purposes and not for local decisions (unless mandated by 
federal law). They decline to apply an immigration-status filter for 
participation in municipal affairs, for receipt of local services, or for 
access to local benefits. They may seek to limit the involvement of 
local entities in sharing immigration information with federal officials 
and to distance local officials from federal immigration enforcement 
to the maximum extent permissible.204 
This category of local policies is not inconsistent with federal law 
and should not be at risk of preemption on grounds applicable to 
local enforcement measures. Local governments that reject 
consideration of immigration-status distinctions are affirmatively 
furthering the principles of non-discrimination and equality that lie at 
the heart of the Civil Rights Act. Local or state integration laws 
enhance civic participation, reduce the risk of discrimination, and 
promote the equality of immigrants in society. The laws are not 
merely operating in the interstices of federal immigration 
enforcement requirements; rather they are supported by the federal 
value of immigrant equality. 
 
 203.  The term “sanctuary” risks confusion insofar as it suggests affirmative insulation from 
or interference with federal enforcement mandates. These ordinances or laws do not afford any 
formal protection or “sanctuary” from federal enforcement. Rather, they provide that for state 
or local purposes, absent an express federal duty or prohibition, immigration status will not be 
pursued or considered. For an excellent cataloguing and discussion of many such laws, see 
Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 600–05. The term has no single agreed-upon definition. For a range 
of compilations and definitions see Corrie Bilke, Divided We Stand, United We Fall: A Public 
Policy Analysis of Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the “Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV. 
165, 180 (2009) (discussing the 2006 Congressional Research Service); S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan & Tom (Tak) Wong, Immigration Policies go Local: The Varying Responses of 
Local Governments to Undocumented Immigration 10 (2007), http://www.law. 
berkeley.edu/files/RamakrishnanWongpaperfinal.pdf (finding seventy-one “pro-immigrant” or 
“sanctuary” ordinances broadly defined). NumbersUSA lists three states—Oregon, Utah, and 
Vermont—and 142 localities as having some form of “sanctuary law,” which they define as any 
law or policy preventing police from asking about or acting on immigration information in a 
variety of circumstances. See Sanctuary Laws, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa.com/ 
content/learn/national-security/sanctuary-laws.html. See also About Sanctuary Policies, 
NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/american-workers/sanctuary-
policy.html. 
 204.  See generally Kristina A. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid is Never a Crime? The Politics 
of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 111–15 
(2012); Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
573 (2010). 
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This understanding may help address a concern that is sometimes 
raised to suggest that tolerance of state immigration enforcement 
measures is necessary to also give states the leeway to adopt 
immigrant-friendly and immigrant-integration laws. Supporters of 
sub-federal immigrant integration policies have suggested that a 
strong federal immigration preemption rule may undermine or 
eviscerate the capacity of states and localities to welcome immigrants 
into their communities through positive local initiatives.205 The 
implication is that a robust doctrine of immigration preemption 
barring local immigration enforcement laws may be a two-edged 
sword that threatens immigrant-protection laws. Under this view, a 
presumption in favor of preemption—as I believe Arizona 
functionally adopts with regard to state enforcement measures206—
might be seen (mistakenly) as impeding states’ authority to enact 
immigrant-friendly measures. 
I believe this worry assumes a narrow conception of preemption 
that does not take account of the immigrant equality element of 
federal law. Recognition of the equality component means that local 
laws advancing immigrant equality are conceptually distinct from laws 
that target immigrants for enforcement. Local equality-promoting 
measures affirmatively effectuate the federal equality norm of the 
Civil Rights Act, whereas state immigration enforcement laws 
obstruct or conflict with the anti-discrimination mandate. Robust 
preemption of local enforcement initiatives should not diminish a 
state’s flexibility to experiment with equality measures that further 
immigrant integration. 
C. Preventing Harassment 
The Civil Rights Act immigrant equality element also finds 
support in Arizona’s anti-harassment analysis. The Court’s decision 
recognized the federal interest in preventing local harassment of 
foreign nationals.207 The basis for that interest is preserving federal 
 
 205.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 567 (arguing that courts should adopt a weaker 
preemption regime in the immigration context for the purpose of protecting the prerogative of 
states and localities to enact policies integrating immigrants). Cf. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & 
Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 
WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1717 (2009) (expressing potential “hesitation with recognizing the validity 
of sanctuary policies under the preemption doctrine” for fear “that allowing inclusionary 
measures to survive the preemption doctrine requires similar treatment of exclusionary laws”).  
 206.  Guttentag, Immigration Preemption, supra note 11, at 34.  
 207.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012). 
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control over foreign relations. But, like the protection against 
discrimination, the concern with harassment is focused on the 
potential consequences of local laws. The reason the laws are deemed 
inconsistent with federal purposes is that they threaten immigrants 
with the risk—not the certainty—of harassment or abuse. In that 
respect, preventing harassment is closely related to avoiding 
discrimination or furthering equality. All are assessing the threat to 
federal values by predicting the potential impact on immigrants, albeit 
based on different rationales. 
As Arizona explained, the rationale for prohibiting unsanctioned 
harassment by local officials is to prevent tensions with other nations 
if their nationals are mistreated in the United States and to protect 
Americans abroad from retaliatory actions by foreign governments.208 
Prohibiting mistreatment is thus derivative of the interest in 
maximizing federal control over matters that touch on foreign 
relations. In contrast, the 1870 Act’s foundation for non-
discrimination is based on the interest in protecting non-citizens as 
the end in itself. 
Nonetheless, both the civil rights and the foreign relations 
rationales consider the risk that state laws pose for immigrants. This is 
a more encompassing view of the federal interest because it extends 
beyond narrowly looking at Congress’s policies on regulating, 
punishing, conditioning, or blessing the presence of non-citizens in the 
United States under the immigration statutes. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 
the anti-discrimination principle of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 
the anti-harassment principle emanating from the foreign affairs 
power converged when the Court invoked both to strike down the 
Pennsylvania registration law.209 
 
 208.  Arizona noted that foreign nationals could be harassed as a consequence of SB 1070. 
Id. at 2498. The Court explained that “[p]erceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States 
may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.” Id. Central to foreign 
relations is “the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals 
are in another country.” Id. at 2498–99 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64, (1941)). 
The Court found a threat to federal interests in the risk of “unnecessary harassment of some 
aliens . . . whom federal officials determine should not be removed.” Id. at 2506.  
 209.  See Hines, 312 U.S. at 62–66 (providing the anti-harassment rationale); id at 69 (“Our 
Constitution and our Civil Rights Act have guaranteed to aliens ‘the equal protection of the 
laws (which) is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 369 (1886))); see also supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text. The congressional 
debates over the alien provisions in the 1870 Act reflect the close relationship between the two 
rationales. In advocating for his bill, Senator Stewart cited, among other reasons, the treaty 
rights of the Chinese and the duty of the United States to prevent harassment and 
discrimination. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658, 3807 (1870). Thus, the federal 
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*  *  * 
The federal interest in protecting non-citizens against harassment 
and discrimination erect a framework that tilts in favor of state 
measures furthering immigrant equality and against measures 
increasing immigration discrimination. This suggests that states and 
localities may generally (subject to express, permissible federal 
prohibitions) elect to disregard immigration status distinctions when 
they choose, and may enforce immigration violations only as federal 
law affirmatively permits. This, in turn, reflects a federal scheme that 
prohibits parochial discrimination and values sub-federal immigrant 
equality. States retain latitude to innovate and to foster immigrant 
integration within a broad zone consistent with an immigrant-equality 
goal. This conception of local autonomy effectuates the “overriding 
national policies” of the federal scheme.210 
This is not to suggest that the immigrant equality element of 
federal law applies mechanically to permit or preempt state laws 
solely depending on whether they are characterized as enforcement 
or integration measures—or as “equality” or “discrimination” laws. 
Preemption necessarily depends on a careful assessment of the actual 
state statute, its intended and likely effects, and the scope of federal 
protections, permissions, and prohibitions. My claim is not that the 
1870 Act categorically prohibits or allows every kind of state law of 
one category or another. 
My modest ambition is to demonstrate that immigration 
preemption must take account of the overlooked immigrant equality 
element that is embedded in federal law. Arizona assertively enforced 
the immigration control component of preemption. A fuller reading 
of the federal framework should give equal stature and force to the 
immigrant equality norm. 
 
 
 
prohibition against state discrimination Stewart advanced served both to protect the Chinese 
and to fulfill treaty obligations.  
 210.  This does not preclude Congress from expressly legislating (if otherwise within its 
allowable powers) to specify what is consistent with and contrary to federal law. But when 
congressional purpose is discerned from the broad framework, the immigrant equality norm 
acts, at a minimum, as the proverbial thumb on the preemption scale. Cf. Young, supra note 2, 
at 274–75 (discussing the general “thumb on the scale” against preemption).  
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CONCLUSION 
The Supremacy Clause mandates fidelity to federal law over 
conflicting state measures. Judicial enforcement requires discerning 
congressional purpose to reject state laws that “stand[] as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”211 Defining the federal objectives, though 
inevitably disputed and inexact, compels courts to identify the 
appropriate federal interest and legislative framework. For 
immigration federalism, an assessment of the federal scheme must 
look beyond the confines of the immigration statute and immigration 
control. Preemption must include the broad immigrant equality goals 
embedded in federal law that prohibit state alienage discrimination. 
The centrality of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to that endeavor is 
demonstrated by the scope of the Act and the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of its purpose. As a new generation of state and local 
immigration measures become subject to scrutiny under principles of 
preemption and federal supremacy, the importance of enforcing 
immigrant equality as a core component of federal law grows. The 
values that equality embraces provide further grounds for questioning 
state immigration enforcement measures while encouraging local 
immigrant integration initiatives to flourish. 
 
 
 211.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).  
